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BOOK REVIEW
LIBERTY VS. EQUALITY IN DEFENSE OF PRIVILEGED
WHITE MALES
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION LAWS, by Richard A. Epstein.* Harvard University Press,
1992. Pp. 530. $39.95
NANCY E. DOWD**
I. INTRODUCTION
This book is disturbing in more ways than I can count.
Grounded in libertarianism and law-and-economics, its thesis is
that the principles of choice and freedom of association outweigh
equality and justice, justifying the abolition of private employment
discrimination law and the imposition of severe limitations on pub-
lic employment discrimination law.' In brief, it is a thesis that
could best be used to defend privileged white males and the privi-
leged white male community Epstein accepts, indeed defends, as
"rational discrimination" the perpetuation of the disadvantaged
status of minorities and women by ignoring the realities of power
and defending the right to include or exclude from one's commu-
nity on the basis of conscious or unconscious prejudice.2 The justi-
fication is the powerful rhetoric of "choice," supplemented by ex-
plicit and implicit stereotypes of race and gender.3
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago. A.B.,
Columbia, 1964; B.A., Oxford University, 1966; LL.B., Yale Law School, 1968.
** Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law. Lynette Williams, J.D. 1993,
provided invaluable research assistance for this Article. I am indebted to Walter Weyrauch,
Patricia Bradford, Elizabeth McCulloch, Martha Peters, Sharon Rush, Kenneth Nunn, and
John Chambers for their insights and comments.
1. RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GRouNDs: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DiScRIMINA-
TION LAws (1992).
2. Id. at 3, 59-78.
3. Id. at 26, 29-43.
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This book is disturbing because I strongly disagree with its value
judgments. I think equality4 and justice are more important than
choice and freedom of association. I would defend that position on
utilitarian as well as moral grounds. I am a feminist, in methodol-
ogy and perspective. At the very least, that means I look to see
how those groups historically and currently disadvantaged, includ-
ing women and minorities, and especially minority women, are af-
fected by particular analyses; I look to see who benefits, given our
current context, and what voice or interests are attributed to those
who have historically been silent or ignored. I see gender as a pow-
erful social construct deeply embedded in the employment struc-
ture that limits, in ways we have not yet effectively described, the
way we experience both family and work. I see race just as deeply
embedded in our employment structure. We have done far too lit-
tle, rather than too much, about race. Employment discrimination
law largely represents a conservative structure that has hindered a
more progressive view of civil rights which would require govern-
ment to play a significant role as a civil rights leader. I see law as
both ideology and as practical tool, protecting people and changing.
the way people operate, even if it does not change the way people
think. Yet law can, at its best, change the way people think, be-
cause it is persuasive and powerful rhetoric. I do not have a singu-
lar position as to whether keeping government out or letting gov-
ernment in is better. It depends on the context, the distribution of
power, and the articulated principles or values at stake. I am also a
4. I do not intend to define equality or argue at length for a particular construction of the
term in this Article. My views on equality are set forth in Nancy E. Dowd, Maternity Leave:
Taking Sex Differences into Account, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 699 (1986). I agree with the view
that equality means more than formal equality, or color blindness; it also means an antisub-
jugation rule and the promise of meaningful political, social, and economic participation.
See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986) (arguing
that subordination of groups in society is inappropriate and that legal action is appropriate
to eliminate power disparities); Kimberlb W Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment,
101 HARv. L. REV. 1331 (1988) (asserting that the black community must actively develop
and maintain a distinct political consciousness to overcome the subordination created by
neutral laws); Richard Delgado, Recasting the American Race Problem, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1389
(1991) (concluding that neutral principles are incoherent and will not remedy racial power
disparities); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 35 CAL. L. REV. 1279
(1987) (asserting that acceptance of women's biological or racially based differences from
men will lead to equality of the sexes).
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teacher of employment discrimination law, which perhaps gives me
a vested interest in maintaining the existence of this body of law.
So if I start from what I believe are valued principles and politi-
cal positions, I simply disagree with what Epstein has to say "Sim-
ply disagree" is perhaps not strong enough; his intent seems to be
to insult and to get under the skin of individuals with whom he
disagrees. He succeeds in that. But if it is solely a question of argu-
ing opposing values, then whoever has the stronger, more persua-
sive argument should prevail; that is what the marketplace of ideas
is about. Indeed, both the libertarian and the law-and-economics
perspectives pose useful challenges to the underlying principles
and assumptions of employment discrimination law.
Law-and-economics analysis forces supporters of civil rights to
evaluate the costs and benefits of discrimination law. The critics of
law-and-economics, in turn, challenge its proponents to defend
their definitions of "costs" and "benefits" and state why cost-bene-
fit analysis should be the relevant inquiry The libertarian perspec-
tive questions why government regulation or intervention is prefer-
able to private decisionmaking, and focuses attention on the costs
of government intervention-whether it is the cost of increased
paperwork and bureaucracy, or the cost of direct or indirect coer-
cion on flexible, creative decisionmaking. The critics of libertarian-
ism challenge its proponents in turn to demonstrate how power can
be reallocated in an unequal society without government-sup-
ported or mandated reallocation.
But Epstein does not merely claim that libertarianism, law-and-
economics analysis, and the principles of choice and freedom of as-
sociation should be valued. He goes beyond valuing, claiming that
they trump equality and justice, which he calls by the less power-
ful name of "the antidiscrimination principle."5 Epstein says his
argument for this conclusion is not grounded in values or morality,
but in principle: he claims his assault on the antidiscrimination
principle is an intellectual one.6
Yet this book is not an intellectual argument; it is political po-
lemic with little intellectual credibility 7 The book is riddled with
5. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 1-4.
6. Id. at 6.
7. For a definition of good scholarship, see infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
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statements of fact that have no visible means of support other
than the unsubstantiated and uninformed views of the author.'
Epstein's opinion is often the basis or initial presumption from
which a line of argument proceeds.9 Following any particular line
of argument is difficult, however, as opinions and conclusions are
often stated with no argument or data to support them, and Ep-
stein then simply skips to another observation. 10 As Epstein is an
outsider to the employment discrimination field, not a specialist,
some of his methods might be rationalized as the price paid for a
fresh perspective, particularly when the focus is so broad. But Ep-
stein hardly comes to the field without some well-defined positions,
which figure prominently in the book, particularly as a critic of
changes in the traditional "employment at will" doctrine and as an
advocate of the abolition of the National Labor Relations Act." In
areas that Epstein explores for the first time, his arguments are
even more clearly in need of rigorous support, unless he really
means to say, "I haven't read much in this area, but based on a
limited read and just letting my mind work, this is what I think."
Such a perspective may be useful, but its intellectual weight may
justifiably be questioned.
The uneven depth of his arguments, however, is not the book's
most serious flaw. Rather, Epstein's biggest failure is his refusal to
confront and analyze scholarly work that undermines or challenges
the fundamental basis of his position. Opposing positions are dis-
8. See EPsTEIN, supra note 1, at 32, 65, 66, 147, 270, 377, 483.
9. See id. at 59, 65, 67, 75, 181, 271, 481.
10. See id. at 61, 73, 147, 160, 254, 276, 340, 504.
11. See id. at 138, 147-56; LABOR LAW AND THE EMPLOYMENT MARKET (Richard A. Epstein
& Jeffrey Paul eds., 1985) (discussing the legal, historical, philosophical, and economic as-
pects of labor relations); Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Cri-
tique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983) (arguing that labor law
should not be governed by New Deal-type rules but by basic principles of torts and con-
tracts); Richard A. Epstein, Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Rejoinder to Profes-
sors Getman and Kohler, 92 YALE L.J. 1435 (1983) (asserting that the New Deal legislation
is contradictory to public welfare); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will,
51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947 (1984) (stating that efforts to undermine or abolish the contract at
will disadvantage both employers and employees); Richard A. Epstein, Sorry: We Don't
Need the NLRB - or its Enabling Legislation, L.A. DAmY J., July 24, 1985, at 4 (arguing
that the National Labor Relations Act should be abolished, as it benefits some workers at
the expense of both other workers and society at large).
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missed with a sentence or simply ignored.12 -Epstein's paean to
12. In the conclusion, Epstein gives a bare paragraph to the concept that racial and sex-
ual difference is socially constructed.
This constant attack on statistical methods and insurance rests on a larger
view of culture that is doubtless false as well. We are constantly instructed
that differences between the sexes and among the various races are always so-
cially constructed. The use of the term gender instead of sex is an effort to
make it appear as though the differences between the sexes were mere acci-
dents of biology that have no social relevance in employment settings and no
long-term consequences for the welfare of either men or women. Similarly, dif-
ferences along racial, ethnic, or religious lines are regarded as superficial and
transient, so persons are to be treated as perfectly fungible with one an-
other-unless, of course, the appeal to these same differences is made on be-
half of, if not by, persons who fall into the appropriate protected categories.
Then the differences are always relevant if not decisive.
EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 504.
On the social construction of gender, there is a rich literature of feminist jurisprudence.
See, e.g., TovE S. DAHL, WOMEN'S LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO FEMiNIST JURISPRUDENCE
(1987); MARTHA A. FiNEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY (1991) [hereinafter FiNmAN, ILLu-
SION]; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING
ALL THE DIFERENCE (1990); SUSAN M. OluN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989);
DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER. SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW (1989); CAROL
SiuRT, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW (1989); Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal
Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829 (1990); Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing
Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REV. 25 (1990); Mary Joe
Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1045 (1992); Sylvia A.
Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 187; Sylvia A.
Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984) [hereinafter Law,
Rethinking Sex]; Littleton, supra note 4; Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986
Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REV. 10 (1987) [hereinafter Minow,
Justice Engendered]; Katherine O'Donovan, Engendering Justice: Women's Perspectives
and the Rule of Law, 39 U. TORONTO L.J. 127 (1987); Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/
Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 254 (1992); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist
Jurisprudence, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of the
Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men's Consciences and Women's Fidelity, 101 YALE L.J. 775
(1992); Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHL LEGAL F. 59;
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHL L. REV. 1 (1988); Joan C. Williams,
Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989) [hereinafter Williams, Deconstructing
Gender]; Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern
Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296.
In addition, the conclusion is the only place that Epstein confronts the concept of uncon-
scious racism:
The drive for institutional conformity is further buttressed by pointing to
practices of unconscious racism or sexism, which it is said must be rooted out
at all costs. But there is scant recognition that much of today's underground
resentment of the civil rights movement arises from the conscious racism and
sexism that is so visible, powerful, and formalized in modern institutions.
Freudian sophistication and Freudian naivet6 go hand in hand. People who are
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feminism in the introduction' s rings hollow when he largely ignores
feminist scholarship, 4 with its range of differences and rich com-
plexity on many of the issues he discusses.15 Indeed, Epstein dis-
quick to impugn the motives and the integrity of others, to find racial or sexual
innuendo in innocent and everyday actions and speech, find it all too easy to
make race and sex the dominant if not the sole determinants of their institu-
tional decisions. It is as though unconscious racism and sexism were said to
justify the formal, explicit, and conscious racism and sexism that so often run
the other way. Anyone who works m academic circles, and I dare say elsewhere,
knows full well that all the overt and institutional discrimination comes from
those who claim to be the victims of discrimination imposed by others.
EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 503.
The concept of unconscious racism seriously challenges and potentially undermines Ep-
stein's point of view. Yet he fails to address this challenge and instead simply switches to
another topic-that of affirmative action. His point is that conscious racism and sexism per-
mitted in the name of civil rights is much more of a problem than unconscious racism. Id.
Although affirmative action merits close attention, it does not excuse confronting the clams
of unconscious racism and sexism. Indeed, if unconscious racism and sexism are conceded,
then a strong justification exists for paying attention to race and sex to ensure that they are
not used to deny employment opportunities.
On unconscious racism, see Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protec-
tion: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). See also infra notes
114-18 and accompanying text (discussing disparate-impact analysis).
13. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 2.
14. Catharmne MacKinnon, whom Epstein cites in his chapter on sexual harassment, is the
sole exception. See id. at 353, 358.
15. For example, Epstein discusses pregnancy, pensions, and sexual harassment m chap-
ters 15-17. Each of these topics has generated rich feminist scholarship. On pregnancy, see
NANCY CHODORow, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978); Clare Dalton, Perspectives on
Childbirth, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 634 (1989); Dowd, supra note 4; Nancy S. Erick-
son, Pregnancy Discrimination: An Analytical Approach, 5 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 83 (1979);
Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the
Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986); Herma H. Kay, Models of Equality, 1985
U. ILL. L. REV. 39; Littleton, supra note 4; Mary F Radford, Wimberly and Beyond: Analyz-
ing the Refusal to Award Unemployment Compensation to Women Who Terminate Prior
Employment Due to Pregnancy, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 532 (1988); Nadine Taub, From Parental
Leaves to Nurturing Leaves, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 381 (1984-1985); Wendy W.
Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment De-
bate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984-1985).
On pensions, see George J. Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination in Em-
ployee Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. CH. L. REV. 489 (1982); Lea Brilmayer et
al., Sex Discrimination in Employer-sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic
Analysis, 47 U. CHi. L. REV. 505 (1980); Michael E. Gold, Of Giving and Taking: Applica-
tions and Implications of City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v. Manhart,
65 VA. L. REv. 663 (1979); Sydney J. Key, Sex-based Pension Plans in Perspective: City of
Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 2 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1979);
Frances Leonard, Older Women and Pensions: Catch 22, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1191
(1980); Frances Leonard, The Three Legged Stool: Women and Retirement (In)Security, 32
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misses some of feminism's core insights with an offhand remark in
the conclusion.' 6 Race scholarship, whether from the group loosely
HASTINGS L.J. 1195 (1981); Joseph R. Rackman, Sex Discrimination Standards Under Title
VII and Employee Benefit Plans, in 37 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX §§ 4.01-.036 (Nicholas Liakos
ed., 1979) (ERISA Supp.); T. Timothy Ryan, Jr. & Paula A. Rock, Post-Norris Ambiguities:
Unanswered Questions for Women and the Pension Industry, 17 AKRON L. REv. 171 (1983);
Camilla E. Watson, The Pension Game: Age- and Gender-Based Inequities in the Retire-
ment System, 25 GA. L. REv. 1 (1990); Wendy A. Wolf, Sex Discrimination in Pension
Plans: The Problem of Incomplete Relief, 9 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 83 (1986); Pamela S.
Anderson, Note, Gender-based Determination of Retirement Benefits, 19 TULSA L.J. 755
(1984).
On sexual harassment, see Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transforma-
tion of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183 (1989); Terry M. Dworkin et al., Theories
of Recovery for Sexual Harassment: Going Beyond Title VII, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 125
(1988); Edward Lafontaine & Leslie Tredeau, The Frequency, Sources, and Correlates of
Sexual Harassment Among Women in Traditional Male Occupations, 15 SEX ROLES 433
(1986); Martha R. Mahoney, EXIT: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the
Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1283 (1992); Jane P Mallor, Discriminatory Dis-
charge and the Emerging Common Law of Wrongful Discharge, 28 ARiz. L. REv. 651 (1986);
Susan M. Mathews, Title VII and Sexual Harassment: Beyond Damages Control, 3 YALE
J.L. & FEruMsm 299 (1991); Donald Maypole, Sexual Harassment at Work: A Review of
Research and Theory, 2 AFFILA 24 (1987); Ellen F. Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Dis-
crimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 333 (1990); Deborah L. Rhode,
Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1459 (1992); Sarah E. Wald, Alternatives to Title
VII: State Statutory and Common-Law Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 5 HARv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 35 (1982); Katherine S. Anderson, Note, Employer Liability Under Title VII
for Sexual Harassment After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1258
(1987); Sharon T. Bradford, Note, Relief for Hostile Work Environment Discrimination:
Restoring Title VII's Remedial Powers, 99 YALE L.J. 1611 (1990); Amy Horton, Comment,
Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual Harassment, the First Amendment,
and the Contours of Title VII, 46 U. MLa L. REv. 403 (1991); Christine D. Merriman &
Cora G. Yang, Note, Employer Liability for Coworker Sexual Harassment Under Title VII,
13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 83 (1984-1985); Krista J. Schoenheider, Note, A Theory of
Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461 (1986);
Mary J. Shaney, Note, Perceptions of Harm: The Consent Defense in Sexual Harassment
Cases, 71 IowA L. REv. 1109 (1986).
16. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 504 ("The use of the term gender instead of sex is an
effort to make it appear as though the differences between the sexes were mere accidents of
biology that have no social relevance in employment settings and no long-term consequences
for the welfare of either men or women."). Epstein's treatment of feminist scholarship sug-
gests that his remark in the introduction is simply one of recognition, not one of praise. See
supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
On the concept of gender, see CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFERENT VoicF (1982); GERDA LER-
NER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY (1986); Editorial, 13 SIGNS 399 (1988); Isabel Marcus,
Reflections on the Significance of the Sex/Gender System: Divorce Law Reform in New
York, 42 U. MLwu L. REv. 55 (1987); sources cited supra note 15.
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identified as the Critical Race scholars" or other intellectual tradi-
tions of race scholarship," is similarly ignored.
Epstein is not a worthy adversary, but rather an intellectual
bully ' 9 He harms the contribution of the libertarian and law-and-
economics perspectives by trying to shield them from meaningful
criticism. He has attempted to foreclose any criticism by preemp-
tively labeling any critique a "campaign for political conformity,"20
and refusing to acknowledge or discuss other points of view re-
spectfully, much less with intellectual rigor. There is no evidence
here of an ability or a willingness to listen.
In this review, I set forth the thesis and arguments of Epstein's
book and explore these general criticisms in more detail. I then
explore Epstein's core argument pitting liberty against equality
from two perspectives: that of the privileged white male and that
of minorities and women. I argue that this book makes sense from
the perspective of the empowered white male in a privileged posi-
tion in a privileged occupation. Indeed, the book is a defense of
that position and the community of privileged white males, using
17. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAvED (1987); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE
BOTTOM OF THE WELL. THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) [hereinafter BELL, BOTTOM OF
THE WELL]; Crenshaw, supra note 4; Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is
Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991); D. Marvin Jones, Death of the Employer: Image,
Text, and Title VII, 45 VAND. L. REv. 349 (1992); Man J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987); Man J. Mat-
suda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, First Quail]; Gerald Torres, Critical
Race Theory: The Decline of the Universalist Ideal and the Hope of Plural Justice-Some
Observations and Questions of an Emerging Phenomenon, 75 MINN. L. REV. 993 (1991);
Gerald Torres, Local Knowledge, Local Color: Critical Legal Studies and the Law of Race
Relations, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1043 (1988).
18. See, e.g., Roy L. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM (1990); A. LEON
HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR (1978); Frances L. Ansley, Stirring the Ashes:
Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 993 (1989);
Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law, 62
MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978); Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of
Opportunity, 23 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 295 (1988); Linda S. Greene, Twenty Years of Civil
Rights: How Firm a Foundation?, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 707 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Comment, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv.
78 (1986).
19. For a recent example of a challenging conservative argument, see Justice Scalia's
opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2873-85 (1992) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
20. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 501-03.
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one of the most powerful one-word arguments of our time:
"choice." And so liberty becomes a weapon with which to defeat
equality I argue that Epstein's position cannot be viewed as an
argument that most minorities or women would make, as it fails to
take account of their stories. Nor can it be viewed as an argument
that many men, even some empowered men, would make.
II. EPSTEIN'S THESIS AND ARGUMENTS: A GENERAL CRITIQUE
Epstein's self-described radical proposal is that all private em-
ployment discrimination law should be repealed."' He advocates a
position that he admits is "well outside the mainstream of Ameri-
can political thought [and is] a defense of the traditional com-
mon law approach to the regulation of labor markets."22 In part,
his position rests on familiar law-and-economics arguments, using
particular aspects of the discrimination statutes that are the best
(or worst, depending on one's perspective) examples of gross im-
balances between costs and benefits.23 His argument is also based
on statutory construction and the legislative history of Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.24 Epstein essentially complains that the
statute has been radically construed far beyond its language or in-
tent, and that Congress failed to engage in sufficient analysis when
drafting the statute and subsequent amendments.25 He further
claims that history-specifically the history of Jim Crow laws-
supports the libertarian argument for limited government and the
21. Id. at 9. He proposes a repeal of employment discrimination laws as they apply to
private employers while permitting those employers to practice affirmative action without
limit. See id. Under Epstein's plan, public employers would have some limits on their abil-
ity to engage in affirmative action. Id. My focus in this review is on his argument for a
complete repeal of private discrimination law, rather than his position on public discrimina-
tion law. I also primarily discuss his arguments regarding race and sex discrimination, and
only comment to a limited extent on ins views on age and disability discrimination.
22. Id. at 6.
23. See id. at 178-80, 213-16.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988). Epstein's analysis does not include the most recent amend-
ment to this statute, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). For his views on the new statute, see Richard A.
Epstein, Gender is for Nouns, 41 DEPAuL L. R.v. 981 (1992) [hereinafter Epstein, Gender].
Epstein does comment in the book on an earlier amendment that President Bush vetoed in
1990. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 3.
25. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 183-92.
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primacy of private decisionmaking in employment decisions.28 His
most intriguing, radical, and distinctive argument, however, is that
the discrimination laws ought to be repealed because the antidis-
crimination principle is wrong." His argument against the antidis-
crimination principle is most clearly laid out in the introduction
and the conclusion of the book. In his introduction, Epstein begins
from the position that the broad-based social and political consen-
sus in favor of the antidiscrimination principle "focuses too heavily
on historical injustices, for which there is no adequate remedy, and
too little on the economic and social consequences that are gener-
ated by the antidiscrimination laws. The future and present
are being slighted in favor of the past. '28 This acknowledgment of
the historical record of discrimination, particularly racism, never-
theless dismisses the availability of a remedy for such discrimina-
tion on the basis that no remedy can be sufficient. Implicit in this
reasoning is the notion that no such reality of discrimination re-
mains in the present, and that the economic and social costs of
current laws, oriented toward past injustice, outweigh the benefits
of remedying historic or present racism. The appeal here is to fair-
ness and cost-benefit analysis; it is not fair for present generations
to pay a price impossible to calculate for something for which they
were not responsible. The cost-benefit implication is that costs of
compliance with antidiscrimination laws outweigh benefits, given
the contemporary scope of the problem.
26. See id. at 93-94.
27. See id. at 495-98. It strikes me that what this book represents is second-stage law-
and-economics, attempting to add an additional argument to the basic theory of that analy-
sis. Law-and-economics analysis suggests that even when the motive or goal of legislation or
a common law rule is agreed upon as desirable, we nevertheless should consider the conse-
quences of the rule, m terms of costs and benefits. While law-and-economics analysis claims
to be neutral as to goals, at least one critique of this approach exposes how the definitions of
costs and benefits dramatically affect the outcome of the analysis. Even if the definitional
issues can be resolved, the balancing of cost and benefit can be challenged as a superior
measure of the value of legal rules. We may be willing to accept significant costs m some
areas for social or political ends, for example, the costs of the consequences of poverty for
children, because our political goal is not to assist their parents.
What Epstein does in this book is to appeal not to the "neutrality" or superiority of the
economic approach, but rather to champion the values implicit in that approach. They are
the values of autonomy, freedom of association, and choice. He argues these values are bet-
ter than those underlying the antidiscrimmation principle, which he characterizes as a prin-
ciple of government intervention to dictate decisions, thoughts, and conduct. See id. at 2-4.
28. Id. at 2.
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But much more than economic costs are at issue; it is the social
and political costs that are most troubling for Epstein. According
to Epstein, those costs are high; the antidiscrimination principle
threatens the very foundations of the political order. "At stake is
the basic choice of legal regimes under which social life is or-
dered. '29 His preferred legal regime is one based on choice and
freedom of association."0 The connection between choice and asso-
ciation is cast as a right of exclusion in private settings: the "right
to be left alone with the people of one's choice."3 1 It is a right exer-
cised by the majority and the minority, by friends and enemies
(read: by white and black, by men and women) which "allows both
groups to go their separate ways side by side. '3 2 This is in contrast
to the antidiscrimination laws, which "force them into constant
undesired interaction."3 " In short, Epstein's legal regime permits
voluntary segregation, instead of forced integration. Liberty is pit-
ted against equality. The consequences of which principles govern,
and their priority, is stated even more strongly in the conclusion:
More than I had anticipated, my study of the employment dis-
crimiation laws has persuaded me of the bedrock social impor-
tance of the principles of individual autonomy and freedom of
association. Their negation through the modern civil rights law
has led to a dangerous form of government coercion that in the
end threatens to do more than strangle the operation of labor
and employment markets. The modern civil rights laws are a
new form of imperialism that threatens the political liberty and
intellectual freedom of us all.3"
Claiming as his methodology a "frontal intellectual assault on
[the antidiscrimination] consensus,"3 5 Epstein marshals his argu-
ments in six parts. In Part I, he lays out his principles: libertarian-
ism, freedom of contract, choice, and "rational" discrimination. 6
In Part II, he examines the history of Jim Crow and the evolution
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id. at 3-4.
31. Id. at 497 (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 505 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 6.
36. Id. at 15-87.
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of civil rights law.37 In Parts III and IV, his focus is on race 8 and
sex discrimination. 9 In the race discrimination segment he primar-
ily critiques current disparate treatment and disparate impact doc-
trine.40 In the sex discrimination segment he distinguishes sex dis-
crimination from race discrimination, arguing it should be dealt
with under a "separate but equal" principle, and explores other
doctrinal issues under current case law.41 In Part V, Epstein articu-
lates his critiques of affirmative action under the antidiscrimma-
tion principle but voices his support of unrestricted private affirm-
ative action.42 Finally, in Part VI, he discusses age and disability
discrimination. 3
The first part of the book is critical to Epstein's thesis, because
there he lays out what he believes ought to be the first principles
of the Rule of Law: libertarianism 44 and freedom of contract.45 He
describes these principles in the abstract, at least at the beginning
of the Rule of Law Epstein goes on to describe a world in which
the workplace is characterized by free entry and multiple employ-
ers who, under the principles of freedom of contract and libertari-
anism, may make any employment decisions that they choose for
whatever reason.46 He claims that even if those decisions are dis-
criminatory, they "offer[] little peril to the isolated minority Un-
constrained by external force, members of minority groups are free
to search for jobs with those firms that do want to hire them. '47
37. Id. at 91-143.
38. Id. at 147-266.
39. Id. at 269-391.
40. See td. at 205-41.
41. See id. at 269-391.
42. See id. at 393-437.
43. Id. at 441-94.
44. See id. at 19 ("[T]he function of government is to control the use of force and fraud
against the person and property of others.").
45. See id. at 24-25.
The antidiscrimination laws should be understood as an assault on the com-
pleteness of these common law rules and the intellectual foundations on which
they rest. As I will demonstrate in subsequent chapters, there is no reason to
believe that this antidiscrimination system generates additional benefits that
exceed its costs, social or economic.
Id. at 27.
46. See id. at 24-26.
47. Id. at 32.
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Epstein argues that employers who choose to reject or not to
consider minorities or women may be engaging in "rational dis-
crimiation. '48 By "rational" he means in accord with cost-benefit
economic analysis prmciples.4' He disputes the common wisdom
that if employers acted rationally-without regard to race, sex,
ethnicity, etc.-the workplace would roughly reflect the propor-
tionate distribution of groups in the population and in the availa-
ble workforce. 50 Epstein argues, to the contrary, that some race
and sex discrimination is rational, and therefore permissible, when
discrimination reduces governance costs of the employer and re-
flects voluntary choices of employees.5 1
Epstein views this radical perspective as a "benign conclusion
that private discrimination holds little risk of social or private
peril. ' 2 He rates the individual consequences of discrimination as
msignificant compared to the results of the use of force: "Potential
victims can adopt strategies of evasion to escape the sting of dis-
crimination, no matter how irrational and prejudiced. It is far
harder to outrun a bullet." 53 In a final brief chapter, he dismisses
the need for the antidiscrimination principle in a market that he
admits does not universally ensure unrestricted entry, on the
grounds that "no private employer in any industry has anything
close to the level of monopoly power that justifies the use of the
antidiscrimination principle."5'
The "rational discrimination" concept merits close scrutiny be-
cause it is a frank apology or justification for discrimination. Ep-
stein's argument is that most employment contracts are long-term,
relational contracts.55 In contrast to spot contracts, or one-time
transactions, where he agrees that discrimination is irrational, he
finds that in long-term contracts discrimination may be rational in
view of the essential role of workplace norms and culture in gov-
48. See id. at 59.
49. See id. at 66-67.
50. See id. at 76-77.
51. See id. at 61-69.
52. Id. at 79.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 87.
55. Id. at 60.
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erning the workplace.5 6 He describes the role of discrimination
here as "useful. '57
Discrimination is "useful," according to Epstein, because the
more an employer can minimize differences, or "tastes," the easier
it is to govern the workplace and keep workers happy 8 Discrimi-
nation minimizes these governance costs and is therefore rational. 9
"To the extent, therefore, that individual tastes are grouped by
race, by sex, by age, by national origin-and to some extent they
are-then there is a necessary conflict between the commands of
any antidiscrimination law and the smooth operation of the
firm."60 Epstein proceeds to argue that enforcement of firm culture
is easier when "members of a firm are all drawn from the same
ethnic or racial group," because these groups also associate in so-
cial and residential settings, and therefore reputational and social
constraints support informal workplace norms. 1 Social and resi-
dential segregation is thus cast as voluntary association which
helps justify workplace segregation.
Because of these voluntary associations of employees and gov-
ernance concerns of employers, Epstein argues that a certain
amount of voluntary discrimination will always remain and is ra-
tional.6 2 Differences in firm profiles are not only rational, he says,
but are "natural."6 3 That this voluntary discrimination would then
vary considerably the opportunities available to some on the basis
of race, sex, etc. is something that Epstein also finds rational, be-
cause the costs of equal opportunity outweigh the benefits."
These are outrageous statements, filled with stereotypes and
race and gender essentialism reduced to implicit biological "natu-
ral" preference, amounting to an outright justification for skin and
gender privilege.6 5 Epstein is saying that the costs of diversity
56. See id. at 60-61.
57. Id. at 61.
58. See id. at 60-61.
59. See id. at 67-68.
60. Id. at 66-67 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 70.
62. See id. at 72.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 73-76.
65. Epstein presents as a reasonable, desirable reality what Derrick Bell has cast as a
cynical story of American racism and radical critique of the limited reach of discrimination
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make discrimination reasonable and logical. He assumes that the
characteristics he names are related to differences that affect gov-
erning the workplace 6 with no other authority than his own per-
ception that "[ilt is harder to do business as social distance be-
tween persons increases. '67 What we also know, and what Epstein
ignores, is that in most firms of any size women and minorities are
present, but in positions of inferiority.68 That evidence suggests
that it is not that privileged white males do not like to associate
with women or minorities; rather, they like to associate with them,
but only as long as it is m unequal ways.
Group stereotyping replaces individual characteristics in Ep-
stein's scheme. Furthermore, group-identified differences (stereo-
types with a basis in fact, he would call these) are presumed to
have employment consequences."' There is little consideration of
the possibility that other characteristics-such as education, class
background, socioeconomic status, marital or parental status-may
be more predictive of workplace-related governance costs than
those he cites.
There also is little examination of whether diversity has any
benefits-after all, aren't we looking at both costs and benefits?70
For example, employers would benefit from the price competition
resulting from an increased supply of workers due to the removal
of discriminatory barriers. In addition, the costs of discrimination
are not adequately considered: why should employers be permitted
to externalize the social costs of discrimination on the rest of
society9
law. See BELL, BOTrOM OF THE WELL, supra note 17. In ins book Bell proposes a "Racial
Preference Licensing Act," which would permit discrimination and segregation at a price-a
racial license. Id. at 47-48. One would be severely punished for failure to discriminate with-
out a license. Id. at 48. In a recent interview, Bell characterized the mock statute as "my
effort to show that the civil rights laws on which we rely so much have come to mirror the
old segregation laws in that they permit discrimination. And yet they are worse than those
laws because they provide a kind of surface legitimacy." Stephanie B. Goldberg, Who's
Afraid of Derrick Bell?, ABA J., Sept. 1992, at 56, 57.
66. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 66-69.
67. Id. at 66.
68. See tnfra notes 228, 280-82 and accompanying text.
69. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 503-04.
70. See id. at 69.
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Epstein bolsters his argument by pointing to voluntary segrega-
tion, or voluntary association,7 1 but shows no recognition of the
different bases for association.7 2 No distinction is drawn between
the choices of the privileged and the choices of the disadvan-
taged.73 Nor is there a distinction between association for self-pres-
ervation of the powerful and that for empowerment of outsiders.
He would permit privileged white males to preserve their position
and power. He sees no great disadvantage to allowing voluntary
segregation on the basis of the most extreme forms of prejudice;
after all, he says, then those folks will be concentrated in those
places where they choose to associate, leaving the rest to seek em-
ployment in nondiscriminatory workplaces.74
This defense of voluntary sorting is essentially a justification for
apartheid-as long as it is a "chosen" course of conduct. For Ep-
stein, if people engage in certain associations, presumably they are
expressing their desires within a full universe of choices, and their
ability to do so free of government intervention is to be preserved
at all costs. Even if there are unequal choices, Epstein believes
choice is still justified by the greater good that each person is in
control. What Epstein justifies here is a "minorities and women
need not apply" policy For him, the benefit of such discrimination
is that it permits recruitment of a uniform workforce that is easy
to govern, as compared with a diverse workforce that is more diffi-
cult to please and control.7 5 He seems to justify this position by
theorizing that exclusionary signs would be posted outside only a
few doors.76
71. See id. at 66-69.
72. This is Epstein's version of "you can't have your cake and eat it, too" if you want and
value these groups, then you have to accept privileged white male associations as well. On
the differences, based in context, power, and empowerment, between groups of privileged
white males and groups of the historically and/or presently culturally disadvantaged, see
Chai R. Feldblum et al., Legal Challenges to All-Female Organizations, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 171 (1986); Deborah L. Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 106
(1986); Note, Inner-City Single-Sex Schools, 105 HARv. L. RE V. 1741 (1992).
73. See infra discussion in part III.B.
74. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 68.
75. See id. at 61-65.
76. See id. at 45-47. The evidence that such discrimination would be widespread is evi-
dent from our contemporary context. See infra part III.B.
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To the extent Part I of the book can be criticized, among other
things, for being divorced from reality, Epstein might reply that it
was intended to be drawn on a blank slate, not a reality slate.77 If
that is the case, then the prejudice he permits is a part of the
world before the Rule of Law. That makes sense only from a per-
spective of race and gender biological essentialism that presumes
that likes want to be with likes, and that likeness is perceived
largely in terms of skin color and sex.18
If Part I of the book is an abstract argument of first principles
that should define the Rule of Law, then Part II is where Epstein
attempts to situate his argument in the real world of inequality
He embarks on a historical argument regarding the role of govern-
ment with respect to race relations, focusing on state government
in the South in the Jim Crow era79 with the purpose of demon-
strating the dark side of government intervention."0 In order to do
this, he takes issue with the conventional view of the evil of Jim
Crow as gross injustice.81 Epstein claims that the conventional view
77. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 91.
78. It is clear that Epstein's perspective is that the consequences of race and sex are
clearly determined: "With race or sex everyone knows his or her role at the outset. With age,
one knows that although he is young today, he will (if he lives) be old tomorrow. With
disabled persons, however, some people know that they are handicapped today; but we
all know that through misfortune or ill health we could become handicapped tomorrow." Id.
at 481.
Nowhere in this deterministic scheme does Epstein take into account the combination of
race and sex, or other intersections of disadvantaged, disempowered status. On status inter-
sections, see ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE AND CLASS (1981); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY]; Regina Austin, Sap-
phtre Bound, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 539; Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on
the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DuKE L.J. 365; Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginal-
izing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiractst Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Judy Trent
Ellis, Sexual Harassment and Race: A Legal Analysts of Discrimination, 8 J. LEGIS. 30
(1981) [hereinafter Ellis, Sexual Harassment]; Marlee Kline, Race, Racism and Feminist
Legal Theory, 12 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 115 (1989); Matsuda, First Quail, supra note 17; Judy
Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 9 (1989) [here-
inafter Scales-Trent, Black Women]; Pat Williams, On Being Invisible, 4 HARv. BLACK-
LETTER J. 16 (1987) [hereinafter Williams, On Being Invisible].
79. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 91-115.
80. See id. at 93-94.
81. See id. at 93.
The question of civil rights was perceived first and foremost as a moral issue,
as a question of simple justice, which admitted only one categorical answer:
any form of discrimiation on the grounds of race is morally wrong and ought
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fails to see what was really wrong-that government intervention
in private matters was the true evil of segregation. "It was exces-
sive state power and the pattern of private violence, intimidation,
and lynching, of which there is a painful record but against which
there was no effective federal remedy ,,82 The lesson, he claims, is
not to make the same mistake today of permitting abuse of power
through government intervention, s8 even if for a "good" goal. Ep-
stein then shifts to a discussion of the period from 1937 to 1964.11
He views the removal of constraints on government regulation of
economic affairs and the emergence of significant government in-
tervention in labor markets as a dangerous shift in the law,"5 re-
peating his previously published attacks on the National Labor
Relations Act s6 and minimum wage laws.87 Epstein finishes this
section with a collection of constitutional arguments against the
legitmacy of Title VII under the Commerce Clause."8
The next two parts of the book examine race and sex discrimina-
tion.89 The focus is largely doctrinal; there is little examination of
contemporary context or consequences. In Part III, Epstein com-
pares the relative merits of a legal regime premised on the tradi-
tional employment-at-will doctrine with a regime based on the
antidiscrimination principle.9 0 Epstein argues that freedom of con-
tract and employment-at-will principles are valuable and useful
because they support a contract of choice, with no external author-
ity dictating the choices of the parties."1 Informal norms work as
well, he claims, with as much complexity as legal rules or more,
and are to be preferred over legal intervention.9 2 "The basic case
to be illegal. It was the practice of discrimination that mattered. What was
wholly irrelevant was its source, public or private.
Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 94.
84. See id. at 116-29.
85. See id. at 116.
86. See id. at 118-25; supra note 11.
87. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 125-26.
88. Id. at 135-40.
89. Id. at 147-391.
90. See id. at 147-58. Epstein's arguments here are restatements of the position he has
staked out in his earlier writings. See supra note ii.
91. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 149.
92. See id. at 155-56.
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against Title VII rests on the superiority of private contracting
over government regulation."' 3 Epstein dismisses with little discus-
sion the wealth of commentators who have argued in favor of mod-
ifying the traditional employment-at-will rule.94
In contrast to this preferred regime are the legal rules of the an-
tidiscrimination principle.9 5 At the beginning of his chapter on dis-
parate treatment analysis, Epstein discusses the concept of merit,
contrasting the civil rights perspective with the market perspec-
tive." This is critical both to his critique of the antidiscrimination
principle and his case for freedom of contract:
The market model assumes that all elements of gain and loss are
subjective, and that explicit measurement by external parties is
not possible but is obtainable only by indirect inference. There
is no objective test of merit on which any external observer
can rely. There is only the subjective test of desire manifested m
consent. Those things that tend to make a worker more desira-
ble to the employer (and the employer more desirable to the
worker) count as meritorious, while those that do not are not
meritorious. 97
93. Id. at 159.
94. See id. at 156-58. In the process he seems to ignore his own criticism that academic
lawyers oversimplify things: "It is a constant weakness of academic lawyers to think that the
world is divided into two domains, one of absolute liberty and the other of binding legal
rules." Id. at 155.
Epstein gives short shrift to the extensive academic debate on the changing employment-
at-will doctrine. See the following recent articles and references therein for the scholarship
in this area dating from the 1960s: PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE (1990); Jay
M. Femman, The Development of the Employment-at-Will Rule Revisited, 23 ARiz. ST. L.J.
733 (1991); William B. Gould, IV, Job Security in the United States: Some Reflections on
Unfair Dismissal and Plant Closure Legislation from a Comparative Perspective, 67 NEB.
L. RE V. 28 (1988); David J. Jung & Richard Harkness, Life After Foley- The Future of
Wrongful Discharge Litigation, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 131 (1989); Theodore J. St. Antoine, A
Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REv. 56
(1988); Note, Employer Opportunism and the Need for a Just Cause Standard, 103 HARV.
L. REv. 510 (1989).
95. Epstem's preference would be the repeal of Title VII for private employers. See EP-
STEIN, supra note 1, at 266..His implicit fallback position is that if the structure remains, it
should be limited to disparate treatment theory and, if possible, to a far more limited dispa-
.rate treatment cause of action for plaintiffs. See id. at 174-75, 241.
96. See id. at 163-67.
97. Id. at 163.
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In most cases, Epstein claims, "an employer will value intelli-
gence, initiative, honesty, reliability, and the like, so the conven-
tional accounts of merit carry substantial weight in individual per-
sonnel decisions." 8 This view suggests that the civil rights stat-
utes do not limit in the slightest the ability to discriminate on the
basis of "universally desirable (because universally desired) char-
acteristics." 99
But Epstein does not see it that way Rather, because of the sub-
jectivity and contextuality of markets, he rejects a legal analysis
that requires inquiry into and determination of subjective motiva-
tion.100 Epstein's rejection of such analysis is based on the argu-
ment that determining motive for employment decisions is too dif-
ficult; that it forces discrimination underground,10 1 rather than
eliminating prejudice; and that it is an incentive to adopt costly
employment strategies to avoid legal liability 102 He also presumes
that market judgments, where merit equals those abilities and
characteristics which employers subjectively desire, usually result
in choices that reflect practical abilities and characteristics, rather
than "whim or caprice. 1 0 3 This seems to contradict Epstein's "ra-
tional discrimination" argument,10 4 although he would probably re-
spond that desired employees include those who associate with
those of like kind and generate low governance costs for the
employer.
Although he would reject a Title VII disparate treatment analy-
sis as costlier for "both sides" than employment-at-will (most of
his costs are for the employer), he concedes that this theory of dis-
crimination will probably continue to be recognized. 10 5 Therefore,
he argues for a far more limited version of disparate treatment
analysis.10 6 He devotes much more of his energy to a critique of
disparate impact analysis.
0 7
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 164-65.
101. See id. at 165.
102. See id. at 180.
103. Id. at 164.
104. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
105. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 181.
106. See id. at 169-80.
107. See id. 182-241.
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In chapter ten, Epstein critiques Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 108
the landmark case articulating impact analysis, as unsupported by
the language or legislative history of Title VII.1°9 However persua-
sive Epstein's claim of judicial misinterpretation might be with re-
spect to the Civil Rights Act as passed in 1964, his argument is
enormously weakened, as even he concedes, by subsequent clear
legislative history that, by 1972, Congress supported the judicial
development of disparate impact analysis. 10
The chapter seems wasted, therefore, on a classic straw man
(person?) argument. Whether Griggs was rightly or wrongly de-
cided is now largely irrelevant. Epstein's real purpose here, it
seems, is to contrast the public consensus in 1964, which con-
demned disparate treatment discrimination, with the public con-
sensus in 1972 and 1991, which had shifted to dealing with the
much more complex phenomenon of disparate impact discrimina-
tion. By claiming judicial error in Gnggs,"' perhaps he means to
argue that the judiciary imposed this consensus on Congress and
the public. The public record simply refutes him.
In chapter eleven, Epstein moves from text and legislative his-
tory to a critique of the doctrine of disparate impact."1 2 His cri-
tique of impact analysis begins with polemic which grossly mis-
characterizes the doctrine:
Until Ward's Cove the case law under Title VII revealed this
irony. Where a plaintiff can show that he has been passed over
when he meets the relevant qualifications, then the defendant's
burden of justification is low: any nondiscriminatory reason will
do. But let a plaintiff be passed over because he does not meet
the defendant's stated qualifications-that is, because he cannot
pass the test-and the burden of justification becomes quite
high: "The touchstone is business necessity." The weaker the
plaintiff's prima facie case, the more obstacles are placed in the
108. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
109. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 192.
110. See d. at 201-04. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105
Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2), both text and legislative history
now support the doctrine. See Reginald C. Govan, Framing Issues and Acquiring Codes: An
Overview of the Legislative Sojourn of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 41 DEPAUL L. REv.
1057, 1068-72, 1081-83 (1991).
111. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 192.
112. Id. at 205-41.
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path of a defendant who seeks to rebut it-exactly the opposite
of what any sensible system of law should require. 113
At best this characterization is disingenuous. Disparate impact
analysis forces an employer to prove that she has made a good
choice, and requires that the choice be legitimate-job related and
efficient in measuring job-related qualifications-but only if there
is evidence that suggests the employer's criteria are discrimina-
tory 114 The plaintiff must demonstrate, usually by the use of sta-
tistics, that the criteria have a disproportionate impact on a pro-
tected group of which he or she is a member.1 15 Impact analysis is
radical in its acknowledgment of the pervasive reach of discrimina-
tion in the structure of the workplace and its focus on exclusion of
groups. Impact analysis does not, however, aim to eliminate all dis-
crimination from the workplace; it permits discrimination to con-
tinue if the employer can justify his criteria as job related."" The
employer need not demonstrate that he has chosen the best
method, or one which discriminates the least; rather, he must show
only that the attribute or characteristic measured is one that is
needed for the job. 117 Furthermore, subjective criteria, which
113. Id. at 200.
114. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-57 (1989); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971);
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D (1992). For
recent scholarship on disparate unpact analysis that refers to the significant body of scholar-
ship on the theory, see Michael K. Braswell et al., Disparate Impact Theory in the After-
math of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio: Burdens of Proof, Statistical Evidence, and
Affirmative Action, 54 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1989); Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate
Impact Discrimination, 59 FORDHAm L. REV. 523 (1991).
115. See Braswell et al., supra note 114, at 4. On statistical proof, see DAvi C. BALDUS &
JAMES W.L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980); DAVID W. BARNES, STATIS-
TICS AS PROOF (1983); Ramona L. Paetzold, Problems with Statistical Significance in Em-
ployment Discrimination Litigation, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV. 395 (1991) (calling for a reevalua-
tion of the purposes and goals of statistical inference); D. Don Welch, Superficially Neutral
Classifications: Extending Disparate Impact Theory to Individuals, 63 N.C. L. REv. 849,
874-75 (1985) (regarding statistics as one means of unmasking purposeful discriimation mn
light of the "dual reality that few employers openly express their discriminatory intentions
and that much discrimination takes institutionalized forms"); Marcel C. Garaud, Comment,
Legal Standards and Statistical Proof in Title VII Litigation: In Search of a Coherent
Disparate Impact Model, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 455 (1990) (pointing out that statistical proof is
frequently the only proof available).
116. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 999 (1988).
117. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584-87 (1979).
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predominate particularly in upper-level jobs, remain perfectly per-
missible and are given enormous deference."' 8 Epstein's misstate-
ment of impact analysis reflects a lack of intellectual rigor. 119 His
depiction of the workplace is not a challenging metaphor, but a
cheap shot.1 20
118. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HAiiv.
L. REv. 945 (1982) (criticizing the failure of the courts to enforce Title VII vigorously in
situations involving upper-tier positions); Mary F Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Pro-
motion of Women to Positions of Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471 (1990) (arguing that the
"glass ceiling" excludes women from upper-level jobs, not because of ability, but because
they lack personal attributes that the decisionmakers regard as necessary for success).
119. He likewise mischaracterizes the legal standard for establishing business necessity.
Although there is some variation m the level of rigor found in various cases,
one common formulation of the concept provides that "the practice must be
essential, the purpose compelling." On this view it is not enough that a test is
perfectly reasonable and plausible, in the sense of cost effective: virtually any
test in common use meets this standard.
EpsTEIN, supra note 1, at 212-13 (quoting Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 827 F.2d 439,
442 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)). This is the strongest articulation of the
business necessity standard and one not regularly followed; rather, a looser standard is more
common. See, e.g., Watson, 487 U.S. at 999 (articulating the business necessity burden as
one of producing evidence of a " 'manifest relationship to the employment in question' ").
In fact, the Court in Watson held that the ultimate burden of proof does not shift to the
defendant. Id. at 997. The standard has also been more relaxed when safety concerns can be
articulated. See, e.g., Beazer, 440 U.S. at 584-87 (upholding an employer's prohibition of
narcotic drug use, despite its disproportionate impact on minorities, because the policy fur-
thered legitimate goals of safety and efficiency). The Supreme Court's articulation of the
standard m Wards Cove was "whether a challenged practice serves, in a siguificant way, the
legitimate employment goals of the employer." Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659. As authority,
the Court cited to language in Watson and Beazer, articulations markedly more relaxed
than the standard m Griggs. See id. The Court in Wards Cove also placed the burden of
proof on the employee on this element of the case, in a stunning reversal of the understand-
ing of the federal courts since Griggs. See id. Both the business necessity standard and the
burden of proof on this issue were, therefore, very favorable to employers at the time Ep-
stein wrote.
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), business necessity is defined, but not in a way that clarifies
the range of possible standards or shows that there is a single standard. The statute indi-
cates that the terms "business necessity" and "job related" are to be construed pursuant to
a single interpretive memorandum in the legislative history, id. § 105(b) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2), which says only: "The terms business necessity and job related are in-
tended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)." 137 CONG. REc. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25,
1991).
120. Epstein could have raised cost-benefit issues just as easily even with a fair character-
ization of the doctrine. A challenge can be made, for example, to whether employers should
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Epstein's assumptions in this description of impact analysis,
moreover, rely on questionable premises. He assumes that any
qualifications set by an employer are legitimate and nondiscrimi-
natory, and that the hypothetical employee is unqualified (and be-
cause we are talking about race, the implicit unqualified applicant
is black). 2' The logic, perhaps, is that the employer's criteria have
merit because they reflect the employer's desires. That, in Ep-
stein's view, should insulate the employer's choice of a mechanism
or basis for employment decisions.
122
Epstein continues his analysis of disparate impact doctrine from
a cost-benefit perspective by focusing on the controversial area of
general intelligence testing.123 He combines case analysis of Con-
necticut v. Teal,124 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,12 and
Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Aton i 26 with data on the difficulty of
bear the cost of eliminating societal discrimination over which they have no control with no
support from government. If impact analysis required the elimination of all discriminatory
devices, this would be an even more powerful argument. This schema presumes that elimi-
nation of discrimination is essential; whatever that cost is, the issue becomes how to allocate
the cost equitably. Epstein would allocate the cost solely to victims, not to eliminate dis-
crimination, but simply to preserve the status quo, and would expect individuals to pay the
price. See EpsTEIN, supra note 1, at 225 (positing that a civil rights defendant, like a crimi-
nal defendant, should be afforded high levels of protection and that the optimal level of
antidiscrimination enforcement is not necessarily the maximum level).
121. Epstein's erroneous supposition is that an employer's criteria will have objective
value in measuring job performance and that firms behave rationally. See id. at 241 (sug-
gesting that if tests accurately measure ability, employers will keep them, but if they are
inadequate, employers will abandon them).
122. See id. (arguing that government should not make decisions on matters best left to
an employer's choice).
123. Id. at 206-26.
124. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
125. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
126. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). As Epstein expends considerable effort discussing these cases, it
is interesting that he devotes no analysis to Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984),
the Supreme Court case that directly confronts the argument that free association claims
should outweigh equality claims. See id. at 78. In that case, which involved the alleged dis-
criminatory denial of partnership by a law firm, one of the firm's arguments was that the
application of Title VII to partnership decisions would infringe constitutional rights of ex-
pression or association. Id. The Court rejected the claim with little discussion, stating that
"'[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of
association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative
constitutional protections.' " Id. (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973)).
Although Epstein may disagree with the Court's rationale, it seems a significant omission
that the case is neither discussed nor cited anywhere in his book. Similarly, Epstein does
not cite the work of other scholars who have considered the liberty-versus-equality confron-
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constructing a test that meets Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) test guidelines. He also points to the cost of
erroneously finding practices discriminatory. Epstein argues that
the plaintiff's case is too easy to make under impact analysis l2 7 be-
cause statistical analysis facilitates demonstrating disproportionate
impact and because the business necessity defense is too demand-
ing.2 8 Epstein never considers that the reason for this result is
that so many tests are discriminatory.2 9
Epstein explicitly talks about race only in the final chapter of his
section on race discrimination.3 0 In that section his intent is to
focus on the "effects of the antidiscrimination laws on workers,
black and white, in the workplace." ' He concludes that any evi-
dence of gains by black workers is probably illusory; the disloca-
tions since the 1964 Act must be balanced against pre-Act disloca-
tions. 13 2 Although he acknowledges the literature examining the
effects of Title VII,138 he focuses most of the chapter on a single
tation. See, e.g., Marie A. Failinger, Equality Versus the Right to Choose Associates: A
Critique of Hannah Arendt's View of the Supreme Court's Dilemma, 49 U. PITT. L. REV.
143 (1987) (analyzing philosopher Hannah Arendt's preference of associational rights over
the equality principle); Lucinda M. Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the
Search for Gender Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 914 (1987) (reviewing DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., GENDER
JUSTICE (1986)) (rejecting the argument that free choice promotes justice, asserting that first
one must question the meaning and value of "choice" as currently defined).
127. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 216-36. This is the only time Epstein talks about race and,
again, does so only indirectly.
128. See id. at 212-13 (stating that requiring an employer to show more than that the test
is reasonable and plausible does not further any sensible social objective).
129. Much of the analysis of general intelligence tests has indicated that they are hope-
lessly discriminatory. See ROBERT SADACCA, THE VALIDITY AND DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT OF
THE FEDERAL SERVICE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION (1971); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FED-
ERAL EMPLOYMENT EXAMINATIONS: DO THEY ACHIEVE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND MERIT PRINCI-
PLE GOALS?.: A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (1979). Epstein's position seems to be that if root-
ing out discrimination is too difficult or impossible, and if the tests have any benefit, their
benefits outweigh their costs and should be permitted, regardless of their impact on pro-
tected groups. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 212-13. On testing, see generally Mark Kelman,
Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability" Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1158
(1991). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 prohibits race-norming as a way of correcting for test
discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 106, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2).
130. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 242-66.
131. Id. at 242.
132. Id. at 243.
133. Id. at 243-44 (explaining that analysis of each study is not possible).
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study of the textile industry in South Carolina."' He recasts the
conclusion of the authors of that study 85 as one that supports his
libertarian principles and his historical argument in Part II: the
gains by blacks were largely due to the removal of Jim Crow, there-
fore the record supports the value of less government intervention
rather than more government intervention136 (although govern-
ment intervention was necessary to remove Jim Crow and to pre-
vent private reinstitutionalization without state support).
Epstein further argues that not only did antidiscrimination laws
do little or nothing to help blacks, they also "hurt some blacks
while benefiting others.' 3 7 One group he identifies as hurt are
blacks who benefitted from segregation by providing the businesses
and opportunities for the black community when the white com-
munity refused to deal with blacks or was legally prohibited from
doing so.138 According to Epstein, low-income, unskilled blacks
comprise a second group that has been hurt; their position has
worsened, compared to upper-income, skilled black workers. 139 Ep-
stein links this worsening position to antidiscrimination laws and
minimum wage laws which make it too costly for many employers
to hire unskilled black labor. 140 His solution is to permit contracts
to be governed under freedom-of-contract principles even if they
are discriminatory 141 Finally, at the end of this section he returns
to advocating "rational discrimination"-
134. See id. at 244-54 (referring to James J. Heckman & Brook S. Payner, Determining
the Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A
Study of South Carolina, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 138 (1989)).
135. He notes that their conclusion was that vigorous civil rights enforcement was the key
to the improvement of black lives. Id. at 245.
136. See id. at 254.
137. Id. at 260.
138. Id. at 260-61.
139. Id. at 261-62.
140. Id. at 263-65.
141. Id. at 263. In markets where no discrimination laws exist, such as many third world
countries, one can hardly argue that more people benefit because more people work. What
seems equally clear from the evidence, however, is that there is a strong, unspoken willing-
ness to accept class inequality as a means to perpetuate race inequality. Roy Brooks would
agree that the antidiscrimmation laws mainly benefit middle- and upper-class blacks, be-
cause they do not deal with how we subordinate lower class blacks due to our limited con-
cepts of equality. BROOKS, supra note 18, at 3-4, 9-22. His suggestions for change would not,
however, include eliminating the statute. Id. at 153 (recommending reformation, not repeal,
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There are good reasons to believe, moreover, that some (not all,
but some) firms may be better able to operate if they select their
workers by race rather than by some race-neutral criterion. We
should not expect race to be irrelevant in markets, and neither
whites nor blacks should desire it to be so. Yet there is a vast
difference between segregation by choice and segregation by
public command 142
Epstein is arguing that not only is discrimination rational, but it
is also desirable. How much closer can you get to an expression of
racial apartheid? 143 Why we should not desire the elimination of
race-based criteria, or the irrelevancy of race, goes unexplained.
His point of view makes sense only when one examines who bene-
fits from that point of view.1 4 4
In contrast to his virtual nondiscussion of race in his analysis of
race discrimination, Epstein talks very explicitly about sex, age,
and disability.14 He sees crucial distinctions between these various
forms of discrimination:
[R]ace, sex, and age cases often present very different issues.
Thus, explicit age classifications are common in all segments of
the unregulated labor market. My educated guess is that the
statutes that render these classifications illegal are apt to be far
more intrusive than those statutes that prohibit racial classifica-
tions, which most firms would find largely irrelevant. Sex classi-
fications form an intermediate case; these are desirable in many
occupations (nursing, heavy labor) but are usually regarded as
far less relevant in others (academics, for example). The mis-
chief worked by an antidiscrimination statute is not constant
across all occupations and all grounds for discrimination. 46
He develops these positions m Part IV, concerning sex discrimina-
tion, and Part V, discussing age and disability discrimination.
of Title VII). Epstein's analysis seems to suggest only a certain place can be occupied by
blacks, and only the best qualified win.
142. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 266 (emphasis added).
143. The term is drawn from ANDREw HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPA-
RATE, HosTILE, UNEQUAL (1992).
144. See infra part III (discussing point of view).
145. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 452 (discussing age in terms of its impact on
present and future ability).
146. Id. at 159-60.
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Epstein's position on sex discrimination rests on his justification
for different treatment encapsulated in the phrase "separate but
equal."147 Despite the pejorative connotation of this legal short-
hand used to justify segregation,14 Epstein nevertheless claims it
perfectly describes the difference between sex and race discrimma-
tion.1'49 He ignores, or is insensitive to, the negative connotations of
the phrase.
Epstein's position is that sex-based differences in the workplace
are explained by differences in sex roles that he believes are biolog-
ically determined. 1 °0 One has to wonder about his mention of femi-
nism in his introduction, 51 given that his description of work and
family roles of men and women, his bald stereotyping, and his bio-
logical determinism defy the wealth of feminist scholarship on
women and work.152 He goes so far as to suggest that "any diminu-
tion of men's prospects in the workplace reduces for many women
their total expected income and welfare." 53  One would have
thought such absurd defenses of men's position and power were
long gone. But Epstein believes women are responsible for preserv-
ing men's preeminence in the market, and if they fail to do so, they
also threaten marriage and family- "The pervasive importance of
sex roles can be stated even more strongly: durable marriages often
depend on a conscious division of labor within the family 2$154
147. See id. at 274.
148. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
149. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 275.
150. See td. at 271-72.
151. See td. at 2 ("In my judgment, feminism is the single most powerful social movement
of our time, one that addresses every aspect of human and social life.").
152. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REv. 761
(1990); Mary E. Becker, Barriers Facing Women in the Wage-Labor Market and the Need
for Additional Remedies, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 934 (1986); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family:
The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the
Workplace, 24 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79 (1989) [hereinafter Dowd, Gender Paradox];
Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32 ARIZ. L. REv. 431
(1990) [hereinafter Dowd, Restructuring the Workplace]; Mary Joe Frug, Securing Job
Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REv. 55
(1979); Kay, supra note 15; Littleton, supra note 4; Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1497 (1983); Taub, supra
note 15; Williams, Deconstructing Gender, supra note 12; Williams, supra note 15.
153. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 270.
154. Id. It is hardly an equitable division of labor. On the structure of the household
economy, see FAMILIES AND WORK (Naomi Gerstel & Harriet E. Gross eds., 1987); Joan
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Not surprisingly, then, the workplace reflects different opportuni-
ties for men and women, and Epstein thus concludes: "The differ-
ences between the sexes do matter."1 5 He rejects the notion that
the workplace should fight against these differences; rather, it
should be permitted to structure itself according to difference, and
allow men and women to gravitate to the work at which their sex
determines they would be best employed.15 He sees no reason to
ban members of a particular sex from a particular job, "as long as
an employer is willing to offer a job. 1 57 And finally, he suggests
that no single vision of the proper distribution of men and women
in the workplace is workable because there is too much that we do
not understand about men and women 15 -a mystery theory Nev-
ertheless, Epstein states that the patterns that exist can be ac-
counted for without concluding that they are due to domination
and exploitation.5 9
If you ascribe to biological determinism, then this physiological
fact of sex is the cause of any manifest disparities. If you view sex
role conditioning as fixed and unchanging, created by society, not
contributed to by employers and their construction of the work-
place culture, then you may conclude it is not the fault of employ-
Acker, Class, Gender, and the Relations of Distribution, 13 SIGNS 473 (1988); Myra M.
Ferree, Between Two Worlds: German Feminist Approaches to Working-Class Women and
Work, 10 SIGNS 517 (1985); Heidi I. Hartmann, The Family as the Locus of Gender, Class,
and Political Struggle: The Example of Housework, 6 SIGNS 366 (1981). On the conse-
quences of that structure upon dissolution of marriage, see FINEMAN, ILLUSION, supra note
12.
155. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 271.
156. See id. at 272.
157. Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
158. See id.
159. Id. Epstein further distinguishes race and sex by their histories. Id. at 278-79. On
that proposition, he would not have much disagreement; that is, their histories are different.
On the significance of the difference, there would be a good deal of disagreement. I view the
historical differences as critical to understanding existing structures and culture, and the
differences in the manifestations of racism and sexism. It has never struck me as particu-
larly persuasive that because one history can be presented as less brutal, the discrimination
is any less real. That is like saying physical harassment is worse than psychological harass-
ment, and constant beatings are worse than being hit once. What difference does that make
to one harmed? It still hurts.
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ers.6 0 To do so, though, you must ignore or reject the vast body of
research to the contrary.161
Epstein concludes that the basic issue in sex discrimination is
whether differences are justifiable.1 62 He divides sex discrimination
cases into three categories, which he discusses separately First,
there are facial discrimination cases, which generate his discussion
of the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) doctrine under
Title VII.163 Second, there are cases that he describes as asking
whether there is any discrimination at all. He places pension and
pregnancy cases in this category and discusses each in turn. 6 4 Fi-
nally, he has a miscellaneous category of key cases, which includes
claims of sexual harassment 6 5 as well as challenges to job-selection
criteria and sex-based wage differentials. 66
In his discussion of BFOQ, Epstein criticizes strict scrutiny of
facially discriminatory policies 67 and argues that cost justifications
and customer and coworker preferences should be considered legit-
imate bases for a BFOQ. 6 8 He condemns the failure to allow sex-
specific health regulation for the benefit of workers, especially
without resolving potential tort liability issues. 169 Nothing here is
160. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1749
(1990), for a contrary view on the way we actually construct our gender roles and work roles.
It is an ongoing process, which justifies holding employers accountable for a workplace cul-
ture that constructs jobs as male or female. There is also considerable literature on compa-
rable worth, sex segregation, and job evaluation. See, e.g., COMPARABLE WORTH: NEW DmEc-
TIONS FOR RESEARCH (Heidi I. Hartmann ed., 1985); GENDER IN THE WORKPLACE (Clair
Brown & Joseph A. Pechman eds., 1987); WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES (Donald J. Treunan &
Heidi I. Hartmann eds., 1981); Mary E. Becker, Comparable Worth in Antidiscrimination
Legislation: A Reply to Freed and Polsby, 51 U. CHL L. REV. 1112 (1984); Deborah L.
Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988 DuKE L.J. 1207. For a good basic summary of oppos-
ing views, see MICHAEL E. GOLD, A DIALOGUE ON COMPARABLE WORTH (1983).
161. See sources cited supra note 160. There also is considerable research outside legal
academics on the subject of workplace culture. See, e.g., ROSABETH M. KANTER, THE CHANGE
MASTERS: INNOVATION FOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION (1983); ROSABETH M.
KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1977).
162. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 280.
163. Id. at 283-312. The doctrine permits discrimination when the nature of the work
requires it. See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(e) (1988).
164. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 313-49.
165. Id. at 350-66.
166. Id. at 367-91.
167. See id. at 289.
168. See id. at 296, 300.
169. See id. at 311-12.
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particularly new or startling, except for the customer and coworker
preference argument,70 which is a means of translating his "ra-
tional" discrimination argument into legal doctrine. His chapter on
Title VII pension decisions reworks ground that numerous com-
mentators have tilled,71 adding only biological and social deter-
minism to the arguments:
The ostensible goal of the antidiscrimination laws is to make sex
irrelevant in employment relations. But the goal is incoherent
and mischievous as a universal proposition. The differences be-
tween men and women do matter to both men and women. To
speak of these undeniable differences as stereotypes is to use Ti-
tle VII to reject information not because it is false but because it
does not meet an ideological preconception of what is desirable
in human relations or true in human affairs. 17
2
What Epstein has missed here is the feminists' rich debate on dif-
ference;17 3 he has only selectively taken advantage of difference as
a means to justify inequality.
Epstein's chapter on pregnancy reviews constitutional and statu-
tory cases, adding nothing new to that analysis.174 How you see
those cases turns, ultimately, on how you define equality or how
you frame the issue. 175 Epstein neither acknowledges nor discusses
170. See id. at 299.
171. See supra note 15.
172. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 328.
173. See supra notes 12, 15. Very influential in the debate in terms of seeing the critical
issue as domination, not difference, is the work of Catharine MacKinnon. See, e.g., MACKIN-
NON, supra note 12; CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
(1989). On the critique of the difference debate's failing to take into account intersections of
race and class that create differences among and between women, see sources cited supra
note 78. For the complex issues and positions regarding difference in the context of mater-
nity leave, see sources cited in Dowd, supra note 4. In the toxic and hazardous substances
area, see Hannah Furnish, Beyond Protection: Relevant Difference and Equality in the
Toxic Work Environment, 21 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1 (1987). Most feminists would distinguish
between sex and gender; however, Epstein does not. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 504.
174. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 329-49. There has been considerable discussion of the
Court's pregnancy cases. See supra notes 15, 152. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), in
particular, generated enormous commentary, so much so that one scholar called it a virtual
"cottage industry" of critical analysis. Law, Rethinking Sex, supra note 12, at 983 nn. 107-
09.
175. For example, Epstein critiques MacKinnon, but she is talking about employment
security, while he is talking about insurance protection. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 342-
43. All he ends up saying is that his argument is more persuasive. See id. at 343.
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other points of view; as with most other things, his is the only cor-
rect view.
His most interesting sex discrimination chapter is on sexual har-
assment. He distinguishes sexual harassment from other forms of
discrimination because a common law remedy is available, com-
pared to the general unavailability of common law remedies for
other forms of discrimination. 17 The language of sexual harass-
ment, he argues, is the language of tort.17 7 One obviously could ar-
gue, however, that the more remedies, the better.178 His argument
against a cause of action under Title VII verges on the absurd. Ep-
stein again bases his analysis on the kind of mischaracterization
that discredits the value of his arguments. He claims that a hypo-
thetical bisexual harasser could not be enjoined from misconduct
because the harasser treats men and women the same.179 He claims
this is a major flaw in the antidiscrimination principle: it permits
"unpardonable excesses of antisocial behavior"'8 0 (his synonym for
discrimination?), in contrast to the common law, which would con-
176. See id. at 351-52. His general defense of a common law approach to this area is
another example that suggests he needs a reality check:
Where there is solely a failure or refusal to deal, there should be no remedy in
contract or tort. So, too, when contractual terms differ by race or sex it is a
private matter, best handled by individual choice and consent. Those who be-
lieve, for example, that they are worth more than they have been offered can
search elsewhere. Those who regard taking lower wages as an opportunity to
break into a market can accept the offer tendered. No uniform rule need deter-
mine which offers may be made or accepted.
Id. at 351. For a contrasting view of reality, see Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race
Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARv. L. REv. 817 (1991) (rejecting the no-
tion that competitive market forces eliminate racial and gender discrimination). See also
infra part III (providing a reality check).
177. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 353.
178. Indeed, permitting multiple avenues of litigation, including federal remedies and re-
lief via state and local civil rights laws as well as arbitral relief, has been an express philoso-
phy of civil rights law. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Of course,
there has been some limitation of this policy under the more conservative philosophy of the
more recent Court. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
Epstein focuses on Title VII; he does not explicitly deal with parallel federal or state law,
although presumably he would apply the same analysis. I assume he would be horrified at
multiple causes of action as constituting excessive state interference, violating the liberta-
rian principle. He also does not address Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965);
the contract theory of the executive order would seem to support his freedom of contract
model.
179. See EPsTEiN, supra note 1, at 358.
180. Id.
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demn the behavior regardless of the motive.""' But while it is theo-
retically possible to define equality this way, it is neither required
nor rational to do so. Equal treatment need not be bent to mean
equal discrimination is okay; that would be like saying one cannot
discriminate in a job held only by members of one sex because
there is no member of the opposite sex for comparison.18 2
Epstein completes his discussion of sex discrimination with a
chapter considering disparate impact theory in the sex discrimina-
tion context, including a discussion and defense of the decision in
the infamous EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.'83 case. 8 4 He returns
here to his view of sex differences-physical as well as social and
cultural-as biologically determined. His bottom line is that "bio-
logical, sociological, and historical evidence of sex differences can
be used to explain or justify whatever disparities in impact are
found. 18 5 Or more simply, choice is the explanation for patterns
that appear discriminatory, and choice is enough of an ex-
planation.8 6
There is no consideration of structural or cultural constraints on
choice, or of who has the power to make choices in the employ-
ment setting, s7 except, of course, to make absurd arguments:
181. Id. at 353-54.
182. Beyond absurd hypotheticals, sometimes Epstein is just insensitive and offensive, as
when he describes the supervisor's behavior in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986), as a "frolic and detour" which should negate corporate liability under respondeat
superior. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 363. This is a case that included several allegations of
forcible rape. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 60.
183. 628 F Supp. 1264 (N.D. IMI. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
184. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 385-91. For another point of view, see Eileen Boris,
Looking at Women's Historians Looking at "Difference," 3 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 213 (1987);
Williams, Deconstructing Gender, supra note 12.
185. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 368.
186. See id. at 373.
187. On the dangers of the choice argument, see Dowd, Restructuring the Workplace,
supra note 152; Schultz, supra note 160; Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in
the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1599 (1991). By the last chapter, Epstein's deter-
minism extends beyond biology to social differences as well: "Given basic sexual differences,
both biological and social, one should expect that there would be some differences that
might influence the propensity of men and women to take the relatively riskier commis-
sioned sales jobs." EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 387. Later in the same paragraph, he asserts
that "the social patterns of behavior are more or less consistent with what the biological
model predicts." Id. For a more extensive discussion of his latest views on gender, differ-
ence, and biological determinism, see Epstein, Gender, supra note 24. For different views in
the same volume, see Kathryn Abrams, Social Construction, Roving Biologism, and Reason-
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[O]nly by mandating a system of proportionate representation
can the law eliminate the profound influence of sex differences
on employment status. Yet in order to do that, it must radically
recast Title VII to place an obligation on employees to accept
positions they do not want to take, and thereby to complete the
coercive reorientation of employment law begun on the em-
ployer side by Title VII itself."'8
This nightmare of forced cross-sex employment is contrasted to
the market system:
Of course, within a market system the preferences of workers
not to have female or male co-workers would be respected, and
one should not (even at this late date) dismiss them solely as
irrational forms of bigotry. It is very clear that these attitudes
are far stronger m some lines of business-say, blue-collar
trades involving heavy physical labor-than in others, including
teaching, medicine, law, and many areas of business.'8 8
This respect for discriminatory attitudes is justified by the argu-
ment of choice. 19 0 It is choice only, however, for the powerful, who
may choose to maintain their power and segregated communities
of power, or to associate with women only when they can do so in
unequal ways.
Epstein moves on in Part V to address affirmative action. The
placement of this discussion seems designed to avoid wrestling
with the concept of unconscious discrimination by shifting the fo-
cus to conscious, explicit discrimination. 19 1 Epstein condemns
reading Title VII so as to permit affirmative action, other than in
remedial contexts, as a violation of the color- and sex-blind goal of
the statute.192 Without the statute, he would permit voluntary af-
able Women: A Response to Professor Epstein, 41 DEPAuL L. REv. 1021 (1992); David
Strauss, Biology, Difference, and Gender Discrimination, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 1007 (1992).
188. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 374.
189. Id. On the continuing prevalence of discrimination in law, see, e.g., Report of the
Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission, 42 FL& L. REv. 803 (1990) (dis-
cussing gender bias in the legal system, from law school to courtrooms to firms).
190. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 375 (attributing disparate employment patterns to the
desires of both employees and employers).
191. Id. at 377 (" 'Unconscious discrimination' by whites and by men is used as a bench-
mark for analysis in a world that often contains pervasive conscious discrimination ").
192. Id. at 396; see id. at 395-411.
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firmative action without limitation in the private sector, but would
place some limitations on the public sector.'93 It is critical to note,
however, that his support for affirmative action is based on a fun-
damental change in the definition of the term. He equates affirma-
tive action in the private sector with choice-so affirmative action
means affirmative action for all, not affirmative measures to assist
only disadvantaged groups.19 4  "The central issue here is not
whether quotas are a good or a bad thing but who decides whether
they should be used."'9 5 He sees the harm of permitting un-
restricted affirmative action in the public sector as allowing "the
adoption of both an affirmative action program and the reversion
to an employment system of Jim Crow, if that could be imple-
mented by a political majority."' 96 He would, therefore, impose
limits on governmental affirmative action.197 Interestingly, Epstein
does not see the maintenance or remstitutionalization of prejudice
193. Id. at 396; see id. at 412-37.
194. See id. at 412 ("[Those who want to practice affirmative action should be free to do
so, for the benefit of whichever groups they choose.").
195. Id. at 414. This is not explicit in Epstein's argument, but seems implicit:
It should be evident that the rhetoric on both sides is necessarily inflamed by
one common need: to justify a position for or against affirmative action on the
basis of some comprehensive social theory of right and wrong. But once we
recognize that freedom of contract should be the basic social norm, then the
need for inflamed public rhetoric is reduced, since there are no longer any col-
lective decisions to tear at and sear our collective conscience. Some firms may
well decide to engage in an affirmative action program anyway: it is only a
matter of following the internal decision-making procedures adopted by the
firm. Any organization can opt for a little bit of affirmative action or a lot. It
can decide to hire only women or blacks or anyone else.
Id. at 418.
A clearer indication that Epstein's view of affirmative action is not limited to its common
definition of being for the benefit of disadvantaged groups, i.e., that it could include whites
and males, as well, is evident in the following statement:
Were discrimination allowed as a matter of course, the greatest victory for the
civil rights movement would be to see its own position prevail in an atmo-
sphere wholly free from any threat of government coercion. Why should any-
one be uneasy about winning 90 percent of the battles? Why in the name of
diversity must we exclude a few all-male or all-white enclaves for those who
want them, for whatever reason? Once the question of affirmative action is
privatized, we will all enjoy some modest gain from the relative lack of tension
and from the cost savings as litigation ceases.
Id. at 419.
196. Id. at 421.
197. Id. at 421-37.
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and segregation through the utilization of private power as a po-
tential harm in the private sector."'
In the last section of the book Epstein applies his principles to
age and disability discrimination, arguing for repeal of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act 9 (ADEA) and the recently en-
acted Americans with Disabilities Act 200 (ADA) .201 After his more
extensive treatment of race and sex discrimination, his treatment
here is relatively brief. However, as with his treatment of race and
sex discrimination, he avoids any discussion of the context or of
the reality of inequality, and selectively discusses only a few as-
pects of these two complex areas of discrimination law.20 2
Epstein sees age discrimination as particularly rational because
it is cost justified and because the practice of discrimination on the
basis of age is widespread. 20 3 Even if Title VII is not repealed, he
argues the ADEA must be repealed because it is "peculiarly de-
structive to the health of employment markets. ' '20 4 Epstein sup-
ports his arguments by examining hiring practices and mandatory
retirement programs. 20 5 This seems particularly inapposite since
the paradigm age discrimination case is a discharge case.206 Fur-
thermore, the workplace example he uses to argue for the necessity
of mandatory retirement is the peculiar institution of tenure uti-
lized by colleges and universities.207 Thus, he picks a quirky part of
the employment market to make his case. Not surprisingly, he jus-
tifies the institution of tenure through a cost-benefit analysis. 208
198. Epstein argues, rather, that in a system of choice "there is no prima facie legal wrong
m taking race and sex into account Formal equality and substantive soundness thus
work m perfect harmony." Id. at 414.
199. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
200. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (Supp. II 1990).
201. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 441-94.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 447-48.
204. Id. at 447.
205. See id. at 450-59.
206. On patterns of Title VII litigation, see generally John J. Donohue, III & Peter Siegel-
man, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983
(1991); John J. Donohue, III & James J. Heckman, Re-Evaluating Federal Civil Rights Pol-
icy, 79 GEo. L.J. 1713 (1991).
207. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 459-73.
208. Id. at 462.
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Epstein's final chapter, which discusses disability discrimination,
condemns the newest discrimination law as no better than the
others.209 His position does not seem so sharply defined here as in
other sections, nor so well thought out. He argues that the con-
cerns of disabled individuals might be more efficiently satisfied
through subsidies or direct living grants, rather than through re-
quired structural changes that make the workplace accessible and
jobs manageable.210 This position ignores much of the data on the
cost of reasonable accommodation for disabilities, which shows
that the costs of reasonable accommodation are far less than pro-
viding income support for disabled persons who cannot work.2 11
Insensitivity to disabled workers also surfaces in this chapter, as
when Epstein comments that many of the problems of disabled
workers could be remedied easily by solicitous expressions of sym-
pathy and support: "A helping hand or a kind word can go a long
way in many contexts. It is false, therefore, to assume that dis-
abled people will routinely meet uniform and stony hostility in all
workplace situations."2 12 However, the statute presumes that igno-
rance, rather than hostility, is the problem. Ignorance can include,
I think, the' failure to empathize or understand the insult implicit
in his statement.
209. Id. at 484.
210. Id. at 493-94.
211. According to a 1982 study of accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act, 51% of
disabled workers were accommodated at no cost, and 30% at a cost of under $500 per
worker. Executive Summary of Report on Accommodating Handicapped Employees, Daily
Labor Rep. (BNA) No. 157, at F-1 (Aug. 13, 1982). These costs must be compared to the
costs of income support under Social Security and other private or public support systems.
It is interesting to note the broad political and social consensus for the bill. See, e.g.,
Disability; Bipartisan Support Evident as House Debate Opens on Americans with Disa-
bilities Act, Daily Rep. Exec. (BNA) No. 98, at A-3 (May 21, 1990); William J. Eaton, House
Oks Disabled Rights Bill; Senate May Act Today, LA TIMEs, July 13, 1990, at Al. Its
passage was assured while the precursors of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 headed for certain
presidential veto. See Richard L. Alfred & Thomas A. Knowlton, Civil Rights Act Will En-
courage Federal Claims; The Civil Rights Act of 1991, MAss. L. WKLY., Dec. 9, 1991, at 5;
Sharen S. Johnson, Capital Line: Hiring Quota Issue Snags Civil Rights Bill, U.SA. TODAY,
June 25, 1990, at 4A.
Epstein's point about financial burden on employers is well taken. It is the same argu-
ment that is made against family leave, regarding who should bear the costs of a measure
deemed necessary from an equality and social welfare perspective.
212. EPsTEm, supra note 1, at 483.
1993] 465
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
This overview of the book reveals its intellectual poverty It may
be difficult to agree on a definition of good scholarship, but I think
the following is a good start. It is a definition chosen by Geoffrey
R. Stone, Dean of the University of Chicago Law School, in a short
essay written in a recent symposium on "The Voices of Women" in
legal education;213 he borrowed it from a recent piece by Stephen
Carter:
[T]he quality of a piece of scholarly work turns on a
demonstrated mastery of the relevant material and the ability to
contribute to a dialogue, or to spark a new one. It turns on say-
ing something that not only is not in the prior literature, but is
not obvious in light of the prior literature. It turns, further, on
making a logical argument-not a correct one, necessarily, or
even a non-controversial one, but certainly one that is coherent.
And it turns on setting out fairly the possible objections and
dealing with them, or even noting, when appropriate, the extent
to which they successfully limit one's own position.214
By the terms of this definition, Epstein's book is not good schol-
arship. There is no demonstrated mastery of the wealth of scholar-
ship on employment discrimination law, much less the historical
and sociological literature that Epstein claims as additional bases
for his argument. Stating a position to provoke discussion is clearly
his goal, so, to that extent, he may fit the definition of good schol-
arship. The arguments in support of his view, however, are signifi-
cantly weakened by his failure to consider much of the existing
scholarship. The book fails most clearly as good scholarship in that
Epstein does not fairly address objections to his perspective; in-
deed, Epstein hardly notes any opposing points of view at all, and
when he does, he shrugs them off with little discussion or gives
them an intellectual slam-dunk.215 He does not concede any limita-
tions or difficulties with his position. He displays all the attributes
of a bad listener and none of the attributes of a careful scholar who
marshals his case while considering its weaknesses and the benefits
213. Geoffrey R. Stone, Controversial Scholarship and Faculty Appointments, 77 IOWA
L. RE V. 73 (1991).
214. Stephen L. Carter, The Best Black, and Other Tales, RECONSTRUCTION, Winter 1990,
at 6, 29.
215. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text (providing a limited discussion of un-
conscious racism and the social construction of race and gender).
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to be gained by considering other perspectives. The book certainly
would not meet Epstein's own definition of academic excel-
lence-"the ability to marshal facts and defend positions against
probing inquiry.' 21"
IIl. POINT OF VIEW CRITIQUE: DEFENDING THE PRIVILEGED WHITE
MALE COMMUNITY AND NEEDING A REALITY CHECK
Much more could be written about the criticisms I have raised,
as well as about parts of the book that I have not discussed in
detail.2 7 However, I would like to return to Epstein's core thesis
that choice and freedom of association are more important than
the antidiscrimination principle, and that the failure to recognize
this threatens political liberty and intellectual freedom.218
Who benefits from this thesis? For whom does it make sense?
Epstein's thesis rings true for privileged white males intent on pre-
serving their power and community of privileged white males. On
the other hand, it neither benefits nor speaks for most minorities
and women. To the contrary, it preserves their disadvantaged posi-
216. Richard A. Epstein, Rule of Law: Diversity Yes-but Without Coercion, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 22, 1992, at A19. The full paragraph from which Epstein's definition is drawn states:
It is often said that we want both "excellence and diversity" but that formula-
tion too easily conceals the inescapable trade-offs that have to be made to im-
plement diversity. All too often the modern concern with diversity acts as
though the ability to marshal facts and defend positions against probing in-
quiry represented some narrow class bias instead of the general rules of aca-
demic exchange. We should be willing to depart only grudgingly from this con-
ception of merit and scholarly debate.
My fear is that the present zeal for diversity blinds us to the damage the
departure from traditional academic standards does to the advancement and
dissemination of human knowledge.
Id.
217. For other reviews of Epstein's book, see Samuel Issacharoff, Contractual Liberties in
Discriminatory Markets, 70 Tax. L. REv. 1219 (1992) (book review) (focusing on first princi-
ples, race discrimination, and economic arguments); J. Hoult Verkerke, Free to Search, 105
HARv. L. REv. 2080 (1992) (book review) (focusing on libertarian and historical arguments);
Ian Ayres, Pride and Prejudice, NEw REPuBLic, July 6, 1992, at 30; Clarence Page, Bias
Against Bias Law, CHL TRm., May 31, 1992, at 5; William Peterson, Imperial Rights Regi-
men, WASH. TIMES, July 16, 1992, at E3; Thomas Sowell, The Civil Rights Tax, FoRBEs, Apr.
13, 1992, at 94; Calvin Woodard, In Defense of Discrimination, N.Y. TIMEs, May 3, 1992, §
7, at 36.
218. See EPsToIN, supra note 1, at 505.
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tion and invites retrenchment and backlash. In this section, I ex-
plore each of these points of view in turn.
A. Defending the Prwileged White Male and His Community
There is a clear perspective that dominates and explains Ep-
stein's book. Much of what is written in this book strikes me as
racist or sexist. Certainly if one wished to discriminate not merely
in spite of, but because of, race and sex, this book would provide
an argument to do so. But I will give Epstein the benefit of the
doubt (why, I'm not sure; it's probably a weakness of feminists).
One cannot escape, however, that the book is most effective as a
defense of the position of privileged white males who value a com-
munity of privileged white males. This is not to say that Epstein is
the spokesperson for privileged white males, or that they all think
or act alike. It is simply to say that for privileged white males who
want to defend their position, as opposed to sharing, ceding, or giv-
ing up power, and who want to justify that position by merit, not
by privilege, then Epstein provides a principled argument that at-
tempts to trump equality and justice with freedom, liberty, and
choice.219
The power of the antidiscrimination principle lies in its moral
appeal to justice and equality Assaulting that citadel is a daunting
task; doing so in a way that does not invite criticism that the as-
sault is evidence of prejudice is tricky Epstein's argument at-
tempts to deflect the criticism of prejudice in two ways. First, he
appeals to neutral principles and ignores both context and conse-
quences. Second, he uses the shield of political correctness: if you
accuse me of being racist or sexist, it is only because you are overly
sensitive or are trying to impose your political views on me.22
Epstein's most appealing neutral principle is choice.221 What he
ignores, however, is the power to make choices and the context
219. By the same token, if one were an admitted racist or sexist, and wanted arguments
to support that position, Epstein's book would be helpful. This assumes that one wants to
persuade those who would be put off by direct appeals to racial or gender solidarity.
220. Interestingly, he ignores utilitarian arguments. On utilitarian grounds, Epstein's ide-
als of choice and freedom of association do not generate the most benefit for all, since privi-
leged white males are a numerical minority.
221. The "neutrality" of Epstein's principle of choice, however, is questionable. One has
only to compare his views on choice in the context of employment discrimination to his view
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within which choices are made. Power and context favor the privi-
leged white male. In a sense, though, he does not ignore power or
context at all: his bonding of choice and freedom of association,
together with his argument for "rational discrimination," permits
power and context to dictate and justify any choice. Epstein's ar-
gument provides justification for choices based on conscious or un-
conscious prejudice. But those are choices that only the powerful
can make.
The only power he explicitly acknowledges is the power of gov-
ernment, which he views as a force to be strictly circumscribed.12
He embraces the notion that power corrupts, and absolute power
corrupts absolutely 223 He neither acknowledges nor discusses pri-
of choice in the context of abortion. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due
Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REv. 159 (opposing the
Supreme Court decision making abortion a fundamental constitutional right); Richard A.
Epstein, The Supreme Court 1987 Term: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and
the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 5, 90 n.249 (1988) (opposing the use of tax dollars
to fund abortions). Indeed, Epstein's rhetoric in this book, and its parallels to abortion dia-
logue, is striking. The power of the pro-choice position in the abortion context is its appeal
to individual autonomy in making decisions about matters that its advocates argue the gov-
ernment should not decide. Those who oppose the pro-choice position use the rhetoric of life
and death, and the stigma of being pro-abortion, pro-death, and anti-child. Epstein uses the
same rhetoric to argue for the repeal of discrimination lav. choice and individual decision-
making, instead of government intervention, are so highly valued that they defeat equality
and justice. Consistency, it can be argued, links the pro-choice view of abortion and the
choice critique of the antidiscrimination principle.
Although Epstein would like us to believe Ins libertarian and marketplace analyses are
applicable in all contexts, he concedes that there are limitations to his own rhetoric. In
Epstein's article Rights and "Rights Talk," he discusses the implication of rights talks in
the context of abortion and admits: "I confess my inability to solve all these value disputes,
and I know of no one else who can solve them either." Richard A. Epstein, Rights and
"Rights Talk," 105 HARv. L. REv. 1106, 1123 (1992). He concedes that "[t]he abortion issue
is vastly different from many questions of property and economic liberties because there is,
quite literally, no way to divide the baby." Id. at 1122. After considerable discussion of the
utility of marketplace ideology and required limitations on government intervention, he
concludes:
Yet if instead we develop some grand division of turf by individuals, by private
agreement all parties can exchange and use entitlements in ways that work to
their mutual advantage. The first concern on any political agenda is who shall
make the decision, and not what should be decided. Much useful work can be
done in this direction in property, contract, and torts. But abortion, yes abor-
tion, remains the toughest nut to crack.
Id. at 1123 (emphasis added).
222. EPSTFIN, supra note 1, at 91-143.
223. Id. at 94.
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vate power, whether economically, socially, or politically based. For
example, his discussion of the workplace and governance issues is
without reference to the employer's right to dictate the workplace
culture; he seems to suggest that workers have equal power to de-
termine that culture.224 His discussion of race and sex discrimina-
tion has no reference to power, which is particularly puzzling in
view of his acknowledgment of feminism; the theory of dominance
and power is at the core of the work of Catharmne MacKinnon, the
one feminist whose work he discusses in the book.225 The absence
of any mention of power in his discussion of sex roles is particu-
larly disingenuous,226 and his nearly total lack of discussion of race
(as opposed to legal doctrine concerning race) is the only way he
can avoid issues of power in that context.
Epstein's thesis may reflect a privileged white male perspective,
consciously or unconsciously, because of his life experience. Cer-
tainly, Epstein's resume suggests that he enjoys the status of a
privileged white male within his chosen profession, legal academ-
ics. His race and his gender confer privilege to some degree, re-
gardless of his class, status, occupation, position, or reputation.227
But those factors also are indicators of privilege.228 Epstein's privi-
224. See id. at 60-76.
225. Id. at 275-76, 342-43, 345, 351, 353, 358. The theory of dominance and power is dis-
cussed by many other scholars as well. See sources cited supra note 15.
226. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 270-73.
227. It is by now well established that we accord value to things male and white, and the
combination of the two. On valuing things male in academe, see, e.g., ROBERTA M. HALL &
BERNICE R. SANDLER, OUT OF THE CLASSROOM: A CHILLY CAMPUS CLIMATE FOR WOMEN?
(1982); WELLESLEY COLLEGE CT. FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, AAUW EDUc. FOUND., How
SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS: A STUDY OF MAJOR FINDINGS ON GIRLS AND EDUCATION (1992).
A number of studies have documented the negative self-image of black children, based on
clear messages conveyed about the consequences of skin color. Robert J. Taylor et al., De-
velopments in Research on Black Families: A Decade Review, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 993,
994-95 (1990).
228. One could take two perspectives on the definition of privilege. One is to look at who
controls positions of power and leaderslnp, both in the private and public sectors. In
THOMAS R. DYE, WHO RULES AMERICA? (5th ed. 1990), Dye looks at the positions of power,
status, and leadership in America, evaluating 7,314 positions. In 1980, Dye found that only
318 of those positions were held by women and 20 by African Americans. Id. at 197, 202.
Dye defines power and elite status as follows:
[P]ower is not so much the act of control as the potential to act-the social
expectation that such control is possible and legitimate-that defines power.
Power is simply the capacity or potential of persons in certain roles to make
decisions that affect the conduct of others in the social system.
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lege derives from his education, his profession, his position at and
within an elite law school, and his stature within legal academics
and related academic fields, particularly economics. According to
his Association of American Law Schools biography, Epstein was
educated at Columbia, Oxford, and Yale and then entered legal
academics immediately after his graduation from Yale Law
School.229 After teaching for two years at the University of South-
ern California, he moved to the University of Chicago in 1972,
where he has remained and currently holds the title of James
Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor.2 3 0 A leading scholar
of the law-and-economics movement, he is the editor of the Jour-
Thus, elites are people who occupy power roles in society. In a modem, com-
plex society, these roles are institutionalized; the elite are the individuals who
occupy positions of authority in large institutions.
Id. at 4-5.
His latest tabulation indicates:
On the whole, those at the top are well-educated, older, affluent, urban,
WASP, and male. Although a few blacks have recently been appointed to top
corporate boards, in 1980 there were hardly more than 20 blacks among the
more than 7,000 top position-holders in our study.
Blacks are noticeably absent from corporate boardrooms, and there are few
blacks in government, although they represent 12 percent of U.S. population.
Likewise, there are very few women at the top of the nation's institutional
structure. Overall, less than 5 percent of top leaders are women. Only recently
have women gamed entrance into the boardrooms of large corporations. Even
in government, despite a vice-presidential nomination and a Supreme Court
seat, women still occupy only about 8 percent of the key posts. Women are
more likely to be found as trustees of universities, foundations, and cultural
organizations, but even in these sectors women leaders are far outnumbered by
men. Top women leaders are upper and upper-middle class in origin, like their
male counterparts. However, women leaders tend to have more education and
they are younger. Women leaders are more likely to have been recruited from
education, the mass media, or law, than from the (mostly male) ranks of corpo-
rate management.
Id. at 221.
Another way of looking at privilege is from the perspective of the social scientists, who
define it by their view of class. They split between "soft" definitions of socioeconomic status
and Marxist definitions separating capitalist and noncapitalist classes. The Marxist tradi-
tion further divides by looking to power or status. Dye is from the status perspective. See
JOE R FEAGIN & CLAIRECE B. FEAGIN, SOCIAL PROBLEMS: A CRrTcAL PoWER-CoNFLIcT PER-
SPECTIvE ch. 2 (1990).
229. AsSOCIATION OF AmERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEAcHERs
1989-90, at 335 (1989-90).
230. Id.
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nal of Law and EconomICs. 2 1 He is a prolific scholar with wide-
ranging interests.3 2
Epstein has worked in a dominantly white male workplace for
the past twenty years. The University of Chicago Law School
faculty during that period has had no tenure-track black or minor-
ity faculty members. 33 There have been only a few women in ten-
ure-track faculty positions for most of that time as well. During
Epstein's first nine years, there was no more than one woman on
the faculty Since the early 1980s, only three women have been on,
the faculty and only since 1989 have there been four women in
tenure-track positions, three of whom are now tenured. 4 Chi-
cago's record in comparison with legal education in general, ac-
cording to Richard Chused's study, is below average. 5 It conforms
to one of the more notable patterns Chused found, that the elite,
top-ranked law schools were not keeping pace in adding women
and minorities to their faculties. 2 6 The proportion of women and
minorities in legal academics has changed dramatically in the past
twenty or even ten years, although the record is still abysmal in
both hiring and retention.37 Legal academics in general, as with
231. Id.
232. Epstein is the author of numerous books and dozens of articles.
233. There is only one black faculty member with the title of Professor, but he is not in a
tenure-track position and is not tenured. In fact, only one black candidate has been inter-
viewed on campus for a full day interview during the last 10 years. One black woman was
hired as a visiting professor at the law school without being interviewed on campus and she
was offered a tenure-track position at the end of her visit, but she did not accept the
position.
234. During the 20 years Epstein has been at Chicago, the law school has hired, on aver-
age, one person in a tenure-track position annually.
235. Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on Amen-
can Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 549-50 & n.65 (1988). In 1986-1987, fe-
males accounted for 20% of full-time faculty at 149 schools which participated in a study by
the Society of American Law Teachers cited by Chsed; 3.7% of full-time faculty were
black, 0.7% were Hispanic, and 1.0% were other minorities. Id. at 538. Using the typical law
school, Chused describes the standard faculty as having 31 members-27 teaching in the
classroom, two in clinics, one dean, one running the library-of whom 30 are white and one
is black, Hispanic, or another minority, and 26 are men and five are women. Id.
236. Id. at 539.
237. There is an extensive collection of scholarship on the experiences of minorities and
women in law. On women in legal academics, and the legal profession, see the sources gath-
ered in Paul M. George & Susan McGlamery, Women and Legal Scholarship: A Bibliogra-
phy, 77 IowA L. REV. 87 (1991). On minorities in legal academics, see Regina Austin, Resis-
tance Tactics for Tokens, 3 HhAv. BLAcKLErrER J. 52 (1986); Derrick Bell, The Final
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other, areas of the profession, has not been hospitable to women
and minorities. 55
What I am suggesting is that Epstein's life experience, particu-
larly his employment experience, consciously or unconsciously may
have affected his view of employment relations. Even if that is not
the case, and even if Epstein himself has no motive to defend his
own position and the positions and associations of other privileged
white males, his thesis clearly could best be used for their benefit.
The broader professional world in which Epstein operates has re-
sisted accepting women and minorities, using the rhetoric of quali-
fications. Epstein would accept the rhetoric as reality-he fumes at
the inability of the civil rights movement to recognize real merit:
"In the civil rights literature there is but scant, passing reference
to intellectual excellence, personal dedication, effort, en-
trepreneurial zeal. [No benefits are] the result of intelligence,
initiative, creativity, or plain hard work. '239
Epstein's thesis, however, would provide a far more radical basis
to deny minorities and women entry into the academy He would
permit refusing to hire minorities and women on the grounds that
the faculty did not choose to associate with minorities and women.
His thesis would encourage unconscious discrimination to become
conscious prejudice, and conscious prejudice to become a permissi-
ble basis to deny employment opportunity
Report: Harvard's Affirmative Action Allegory, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2382 (1989); Richard Del-
gado, Approach-Avoidance in Law School Hiring: Is the Law a Wasp?, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J.
631 (1990); Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L. REV.
1745 (1989); Charles R. Lawrence, I, Minority Hiring in AALS Law Schools: The Need for
Voluntary Quotas, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 503 (1986).
238. See, e.g., Sharon E. Rush, Understanding Diversity, 42 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1989) (dis-
cussing diversity and tenure battles). Discrmnnation against women and minorities has not
been limited to legal academics; it is evident in the legal profession as well, in both access to
employment and promotion. Cf. supra note 228 (discussing the plight of women and minori-
ties in professions generally); infra notes 280-82 and accompanying text (same). But of
course women and racial minorities have not, historically, been the only disadvantaged mi-
norities in the legal profession. See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAw-
YERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 102-29 (1976) (examining the response of elite
lawyers to social change in the twentieth century); Note, The Jewish Law Student and New
York Jobs-Discnminatory Effects in Law Firm Hiring Practices, 73 YALE L.J. 625, 626,
630 (1964) (discussing unequal hiring practices as between gentiles and Jews).
239. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 504.
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Epstein also tries to deflect the criticism that his thesis benefits
privileged white males by making a preemptive strike at critics as
allegedly promoting "political correctness. ' 240 This is most evident
in his conclusion, where his thesis is most stridently stated. For
example, he critiques the civil rights movement's appropriation
and misuse of symbolic language, citing "diversity" as
yet another buzzword in the campaign for political conformity to
a state-inposed ideal Unpacked, diversity today amounts
to little more than a call for race-conscious and sex-conscious
hiring, and in some circumstances even the more extreme posi-
tion of proportionate representation by race and by sex. In the
name of diversity all institutions have to follow the same poli-
cies or face the wrath of the state.2 41
Epstein, however, reserves his most biting criticism for affirmative
action academic hiring:
People who are quick to impugn the motives and the integrity of
others, to find racial or sexual innuendo in innocent and every-
day actions and speech, find it all too easy to make race and sex
the dominant if not the sole determinants of their institutional
decisions. It is as though unconscious racism and sexism were
said to justify the formal, explicit, and conscious racism and sex-
ism that so often run the other way. Anyone who works in aca-
demic circles, and I dare say elsewhere, knows full well that all
the overt and institutional discrimination comes from those
who claim to be the victims of discrimination imposed by
others. It is a sad day when any effort to defend the traditional
norms of a discipline, profession, trade, or craft exposes the de-
fender to withering political attack for a covert form of dis-
crimination' under the guise of excellence and neutral stan-
dards. In all too many cases honorable people are attacked as
racist or sexist when the charges often apply with far greater
truth to the persons who make these charges than to the per-
sons about whom they are made.242
This is a not-so-subtle attempt to stigmatize anyone who criticizes
his thesis as a doctrine that promotes and protects the position of
240. Id. at 502-04.
241. Id. at 502.
242. Id. at 503 (emphasis added).
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privileged white males at the expense of minorities and women. It
is a preemptive strike to discourage criticism of method as well as
substance. It is anti-intellectualism at its worst.
B. The Perspectwes of Women and Minorities: Reality Check
and Stones
As much as Epstein's thesis most strongly benefits privileged
white males, it quite clearly does not advance the position of mi-
norities and women. It makes no sense from their points of view.
Although minorities and women have no single perspective, what
links them together points to the irrelevancy of Epstein's thesis.
Those common factors are a reality check about the current status
of women and minorities against which Epstein's thesis must be
measured.
For blacks, particularly black men, the employment picture is
bleak. Most disturbing is the persistence of unemployment: work-
ers willing to work-participating in the workforce, in the lingo of
labor economists-but unable to find work. The unemployment
rate for blacks is twice that for whites.24 s In 1988 the white rate
was 4.7%, for blacks it was 11.7%.244 Nearly one-third of the black
youths in the civilian labor force in 1988 looked for work without
success, as did one-fifth of Hispanic youths.245 Among all racial
and ethnic groups except whites, the percentage of discouraged
workers exceeded the corresponding percentage in the total civilian
labor force.246 The proportion of discouraged black workers, about
one in three in 1988, was more than twice as large as the propor-
tion of blacks in the labor force, one in ten24 7 -and it is easy to see
why, given the high rate of unemployment of those trying to find
work. Black men are particularly disadvantaged. Beginning in the
1970s, two patterns emerged in the employment of adult black
males. Those with some college or more education earned eighty to
eighty-five percent of the income of their white counterparts and
243. U.S. EQUAL EmLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, INDICATORS Op EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPoRTUNITY - STATUS AND TRENDS 31 (1990).
244. Id. at 30.
245. Id. at 31.
246. Id. at 33.
247. Id.
1993]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
entered some white collar occupations.2 4 This group constituted
roughly the top third of the group aged twenty-five to thirty-
four.249 This is not to suggest that occupational differences by race
disappeared: to the contrary, significant occupational differences
remained, with blacks still very overrepresented in low-wage, low-
skill jobs.2 50 In addition, one-quarter of the same age group had
not finished high school and an increasing number of these men
had dropped out of the labor force, unable to find jobs in the stag-
nant 1970s economy 251 The economic inequality characteristic of
black men is strongly tied to the inability of a significant propor-
tion of black men to earn a decent wage.252 Black women, in con-
trast, have shifted from race and gender disadvantage to primarily
gender disadvantage. Black women have closed the racial gap with
white women but, like white women, they have not been able to
close the gender gap in occupation and earnings.253
The economic disadvantages of many black men and women
have some important implications for family structure and family
earnings. Dual-income families and single-mother families, both in-
creasingly common among whites, 254 have been characteristic of
black families for a much longer period of time.25  The significant
economic disadvantage of black men has translated into family
poverty even for a large number of dual-income families.256 In sin-
gle-income families, the gender disadvantage of black women has
meant poverty for a significant proportion of black children. 257
The labor participation rate for women, in contrast to blacks,
has changed dramatically since the 1950s, with the average rate
now at about 60%.258 The rate of participation increases to 70%
248. A COMMON DESTINY. BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 275 (Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin
M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989) [hereinafter COMMON DESTINY]. For a discussion of black class
structure, see BROOKS, supra note 18.
249. COMMON DESTINY, supra note 248, at 275.
250. Id. at 312.
251. Id. at 275.
252. Id. In 1984, the lowest earning 40% of black men earned but 5% of the total earn-
ings of black men while the top 20% earned 60% of the total earnings. Id.
253. Dowd, Restructuring the Workplace, supra note 152, at 466-67.
254. Id. at 444-45 n.84.
255. See id. at 461-68.
256. See COMMON DESTINY, supra note 248, at 281-82.
257. See id. at 279-80; Dowd, Restructuring the Workplace, supra note 152, at 462-64.
258. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 12 (1989).
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for divorced and separated women; single women are close behind
with a 65% participation rate; the average rate for married women
is 56%;2"9 and 65% of women with minor children are in the
workforce.26 ° The most dramatic growth in labor force participa-
tion in the past decade has been among women with children of
school age.2 1 The dominant workforce pattern for women is now
very similar to that of men, sharply differing from that of men only
in terms of occupational opportunities, earnings, and extent of
part-time work.262
Despite increasing participation in the workforce, women still
face stark occupational segregation and wage inequality 263 The
wage gap has been stubborn; women on average continue to earn
roughly 60% of what men earn.264 The gap remains substantial
even when one closely examines particular job classifications or oc-
cupations.265 Furthermore, there is substantial evidence of segrega-
tion within offices, not just within occupations.266
Some of the earnings differential can be attributed to the fact
that more women than men are employed part-time rather than
full-time, although a gap remains even with this factor taken into
account.267 Of greater significance is the reason many women work
only part-time. In most instances, it is connected to child care re-
sponsibilities;26 many women work part-time because they cannot
otherwise care for their children. 2 9 They may prefer to work full-
time, but the structure of the workplace simply does not permit
259. Id. at 235-39.
260. Id. at 240.
261. Id. at 240-41.
262. Id. at 451-56.
263. Rhode, supra note 160, at 1207-11.
264. Id. at 1208.
265. For example, full time women workers in state and local government in 1990 had a
median annual salary of $22,000, whereas their male counterparts' median annual salary was
around $27,000. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 243, at 41. In
federal civilian white collar jobs in 1990, women on average earned $26,000 and men earned
$38,000. Id. at 43.
266. See Dowd, Restructuring the Workplace, supra note 152, at 453 (citing sources sup-
porting this point).
267. Martha Chamallas, Women and Part-time Work: The Case for Pay Equity and
Equal Access, 64 N.C. L. REv. 709, 715-22 (1986).
268. Id. at 710-11.
269. Id. at 715; VICTOR FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 44-45 (1988).
1993]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
combination of work and family,270 or they may prefer to be at
home full-time, but are unable to do without the needed income
from a part-time job.27 '
The impact of children points to an additional critical character-
istic of women's participation in the workforce. The fact that
women typically bear the primary responsibility for the care of
children translates into a significantly greater workload than that
for men. 2  Despite greater participation of women in the
workforce, family work has been redistributed only slightly, if at
all.273 Furthermore, the presumption and reality that women typi-
cally care for children has significant implications for the ability of
women to support their children financially after divorce or if they
never marry 274 As a result of the diminished income stream that
mothers can generate, even if working full-time, caused by continu-
ing pervasive sex discrimination in the workplace, 27 5 one-fifth of
children live below the poverty line.276 That figure is quickly mov-
ing toward one-fourth,277 and is even higher for black children.278
Finally, even for the small number of blacks and women who
enter elite professions or corporate ladders, most never reach the
upper levels of privilege and power.279 The so-called "glass ceiling"
places artificial barriers based on attitudinal and organizational
bias which prevent qualified minorities and women from advancing
into mid- and senior-level management positions.28 0 Minorities
have plateaued in the corporate hierarchy at even lower levels than
women.28' Barriers include recruitment practices, as well as devel-
opmental and credential-building experiences. 28
2
270. See Dowd, Gender Paradox, supra note 152, at 84-100.
271. See id.
272. Chamallas, supra note 267, at 729.
273. Id. at 731-33.
274. FINEMAN, ILLUSION, supra note 12, at 36-38.
275. Dowd, Restructuring the Workplace, supra note 152, at 451-56.
276. COMMON DESTINY, supra note 248, at 8.
277. See id.
278. Id.
279. See supra note 228.
280. U.S. Dep't of Labor, A Report on the Glass Ceiling Initiative, [1989-1991 Transfer
Binder] Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 5316, at 6999-187 (Aug. 8, 1991).
281. Id. at 6999-189.
282. Id. The Department of Labor's pilot project "revealed several general findings that
applied to all nine companies, despite the vast differences that existed between them in
478 [Vol. 34:429
1993] LIBERTY VS. EQUALITY
In short, although from a historic perspective employment op-
portunities for women and minorities have improved, the contem-
porary context is one of persisting, dramatic sex and race segrega-
tion, both between and within occupations; severe entry-level
barriers for significant numbers of minorities; considerable income
differentials by sex and race, with great significance for the fami-
lies of those workers; and apparent informal barriers to promotion
of women and minorities in high places and positions of power. In
this context, equality and justice, and the intervention of the state
to insure some employment opportunity and commitment to these
values, is critical. Rights, even if limited, are essential.28 3 The val-
ues of choice and freedom of association as defined by Epstein are
terms of organizational structure, corporate culture, business sector and personnel policies."
Id. The study found that "[i]f there is not a glass ceiling, there certainly is a point beyond
which minorities and women have not advanced in some companies." Id. Among the attitu-
dinal and organizational barriers identified were:
Recruitment practices involving reliance on word-of-mouth and employee re-
ferral networking; the use of executive search and referral firms in which af-
firmative action/EEO requirements were not made known.
Developmental practices and credential building experiences, including ad-
vanced education, as well as career enhancing assignments such as to corporate
committees and task forces and special projects-which are traditional precur-
sors to advancement-were often not as available to minorities and women.
Id.
The Department analyzed data from a random sample consisting of 94 reviews conducted
of corporate headquarters of Fortune 1000 companies over the past three years. Id. Four
major Department of Labor regions were included in the sample. Id. The data indicated
that:
Of 147,179 employees at these companies, women represent 37.2 percent of all
employees and minorities represent 15.5 percent. Of the 147,179 employees,
31,184 were in all levels of management, from the supervisor of a clerical pool
to the CEOs and Chairmen. Of this number, 5,278 or 16.9 percent are women
and 1,885 or 6.0 percent are minorities.
Of 4,491 managers at the executive-level (defined as assistant vice president
and higher rank or their equivalent), 6.6 percent are women and 2.6 percent
are minorities.
Id. at 6999-189 to -190.
See also KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL & UCLA's JOHN E. ANDERSON GRADUATE SCHOOL OF
MANAGEMENT, KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL'S EXECUTIVE PROFILE: A DECADE OF CHANGE IN
CORPORATE LEADERSHIP (1990).
283. On the rights critique, and criticism of the critique, see Richard Delgado, The Ethe-
real Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 301 (1987); Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives
from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on
Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363 (1984); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Taking Rights Aggressively:
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luxuries only to be afforded once the basic rights of access and op-
portunity and the right to work free of harassment and under an
equal standard of evaluation are afforded. They are principles that
can have meaning only within a marketplace where power is not
defined by race and gender. 4
Minorities and women seek the associations and choices that can
break the glass ceiling. 8 5 But many minorities and women are still
trying just to get in the door. There is nothing in the market
model, and Epstein's concept of "rational discrimination," to sug-
gest that the door would open wider, or that the ceiling would dis-
appear, under a regime of freedom of contract. Why would blacks
or women argue in favor of "rational discrimination," or see it as
beneficial to them? This is the most absurd suggestion of all. On a
purely utilitarian basis, it fails; it certainly fails on principles of
justice and equality
The failure of Epstein's thesis for minorities and women seems
self-evident. If this reality check fails to persuade Epstein, what
will? What seems best to me is stories. The stories that men and
women of color, and women of all colors and orientations tell, en-
able us to walk in their shoes.28 6
Stories are a particularly good way to- get at power and context.
One of many contributions that Critical Race scholars and femi-
nists have made is telling us to pay attention to those factors.287
Critical Race Theory also instructs us to pay attention to class and
The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theory For Peoples of Color, 5 LAw & INEQUALITY
103 (1987).
284. And perhaps where power is redistributed. On views of the law's role in the progres-
sive workplace, see Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Future of Collective Bargaining, 58
CINN. L. REV. 477 (1989) (reviewing SAMuEL ESTREICHER & DANIEL COLLINS, LABOR LAW AND
BUSINESS CHANGE-THEORETICAL AND TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVES (1988)).
285. See Glass Ceiling Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991).
286. To hear a story, however, one must listen. It may seem ironic that I am suggesting
that Epstein read stories when I have also pointed out that Epstein's analysis suggests a
lack of ability or willingness to listen. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
287. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY, supra note 78; Taunya L. Banks, Two Life Stones:
Reflections of One Black Woman Law Professor, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 46 (1991); Bell,
supra note 237; Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles,
99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985) [hereinafter Bell, Civil Rights Chronicles]; Richard Delgado,
Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411
(1989); Ellis, Sexual Harrassment, supra note 78; Kline, supra note 78; Williams, On Being
Invisible, supra note 78.
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to intersectionalities of race, gender, and class."' Both race and
gender perspectives suggest that denial of the imbeddedness of
race and sex discrimination is the challenge for advocates of equal-
ity and justice. Defining the goals, clarifying what equality and jus-
tice will look like, and uncovering the myriad and complex pieces
of racism and sexism and how they function to constrain us is the
task. Where Epstein's approach encourages us to forget subjectiv-
ity and individuality in the process of evaluating principles, stories
provide the individual cases that challenge the objective, neutral
rule and expose its point of view. 89 Stories also demonstrate the
irrelevancy or harm through intended or unintended consequences
for particular groups.290
The stories that I have in mind that Epstein should read include
Patricia Williams' story of searching for an apartment in New
York City;29 1 Derrick Bell's "Story of the DeVine Gift" in the Civil
Rights Chronicles,292 challenging our notions of affirmative action,
and his story of the "Space Traders, 29 3 speculating on how deep
the commitment to inequality and self-interest reaches; and
Herma Hill Kay's collection of stories of women law professors,
past and present, detailing the pervasive reach of gender bias in
legal academics.294 All of these are stories of outsiders; all speak
with voices that have traditionally been silent and disem-
powered.295 They tell us to pay attention to point of view and to
288. On mtersectionalities, see Scales-Trent, Black Women, supra note 78. On class fo-
cus, see EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL (1974); WILLIAM WILSON, THE DECLINING
SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS (1978); Roy L. Brooks,
Racial Subordination Through Formal Equal Opportunity, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 879
(1988); Alan D. Freeman, Race and Class: The Dilemma of Liberal Reform, 90 YALE L.J.
1880 (1981) (reviewing DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (1980)). On
antiessentialism, see ELIZABETH SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); Kline, supra note 78.
289. Delgado, supra note 287; Toni Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule
of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989).
290. The challenge is whether the story presents a singular or more general perspective,
but that is always an issue for argument.
291. WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY, supra note 78, at 146-65.
292. Bell, Civil Rights Chronicles, supra note 287.
293. Bell, supra note 237.
294. Herna H. Kay, The Future of Women Law Professors, 77 IowA L. REV. 5 (1991).
295. See also SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087
(1986); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
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acknowledge the partiality of legal regimes. 28 They also provide us
with perspective, and challenge claims of universality and benefit.
What is Epstein's story? How would he descibe the world as it
should be9 His concepts of choice, freedom of association, "ra-
tional discrimination," and merit suggest a world that reprises the
line from the dissent in Wards Cove;2 97 it sounds like a plantation
economy, or Jim Crow without state sanction.298 Segregation would
be not only by race, but also by gender, the product of choice as
well as well-defined gender roles and patriarchal bargains. Disabled
workers would stay hidden-financially supported, but closeted
away from the workplace. All workers would be equally subject to
age-based limitations, except those with the power to dictate over-
riding contract terms. The controlling ideology of choice would en-
sure the illusion of individual autonomy, while the impact of power
and privilege would ensure the inequality of actual choices and
consequences.
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1990); Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the
False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1763 (1990).
296. Unstated reference points lie hidden in legal discourse, which is full of the
language of abstract universalism. Legal language seeks universal applicability,
regardless of the particular trails of an individual. Yet abstract universalism
often "takes the part for the whole, the particular for the universal and essen-
tial, the present for the eternal." Making explicit the unstated points of refer-
ence is the first step in addressing this problem; the next is challenging the
presumed neutrality of the observer who in fact sees from an unacknowledged
perspective.
Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 12, at 44-45.
297. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
298. Id. at 664 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (1989) ("Some characteristics of the Alaska
salmon industry described in this litigation-in particular, the segregation of housing and
dining facilities and the stratification of jobs along racial and ethnic lines-bear an unset-
tling resemblance to aspects of a plantation economy."). Justice Blackmun expressed a sum-
lar sentiment when he stated that:
The salmon industry as described by this record takes us back to a kind of
overt and institutionalized discrimination we have not dealt with in years: a
total residential and work environment organized on principles of racial strati-
fication and segregation This industry long has been characterized by a
taste for discrimination of the old-fashioned sort: a preference for hiring non-
whites to fill its lowest-level positions, on the condition that they stay there
One wonders whether the majority still believes that race discrimina-
tion-or, more accurately, race discrimination against nonwhites-is a problem
in our society, or even remembers that it ever was.
Id. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Another way to think of Epstein's story is to wonder what he
fears, or how he sees contemporary reality This is the story of
privileged white males trying to preserve and maintain their posi-
tion-a story of fear and threat. As I was reading this book, two
images kept entering my head. One was the image of a white male
faculty member ensconced in the faculty lounge, suddenly startled
by the entry of a group composed of women (black, white, yellow,
and brown), minorities (blacks, Hispanics, Asians, Native Ameri-
cans), and several persons in wheelchairs. The white male faculty
member not only wants to get the locks changed, but is also horri-
fied at the prospect of being forced to stay in the lounge. The
threat is the threat to his sense of identity and connection and to
the power recognized and shared among those of the privileged mi-
nority who have the real power of their class, a power defined by
skin and gender, but limited by class. He fears that these people,
people he considers "other," will be let into the room and even
worse, that he will be forced to associate with them. The faculty
lounge invaders, however, have a different agenda. "We don't want
to change your choices or associations; none of that matters to us
unless it affects our ability to make it as you have in academics.
We want the salary, perks, and prestige; we want to do something
that we love and do it well; we want to write and contribute to
legal scholarship. If association with you is an integral part of that
opportunity, then we will put up with it, and expect you to deal
with us professionally."
The other vision that I had reading Epstein's book was gener-
ated by wondering what would be Epstein's nightmare. The image
that instantly came to mind was inspired by the movie Switch,29
in which an inveterate womanizer dies and is reborn inside a wo-
man's body 300 I imagined Epstein reincarnated in the same body
and skin, but in a world where all the power structures of color,
gender, ability, and age have been reversed. He opens his morning
paper and the lead stories on domestic and international affairs
299. SwrrcH (Time Warner, Inc. 1991)
300. A much more eloquent literary version of this idea appears M VRGIMA WOOLF, OR-
LANDO (1928). My alternative vision here is Epstein reborn as a black woman, but with his
same mmd and principles. He gets to leave the situation only when he finds a way to
achieve equality and justice for minorities and women in the context of contemporary Amer-
ican inequality.
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picture women, more black than white, and a few men, mostly
black, and only an occasional white male. The advertisements for
laundry detergent and home appliances all picture a smiling white
male. Turning to a story about the law school, he spots a recent
picture of the faculty. Gasping for breath, he sees that the picture
is dominated by black men and women, with a token white wo-
man-and no white males. He slowly makes his way to his un-
skilled hourly job as one of the housekeeping staff at the law
school-the only employer who would hire him. Professors often
assume what he has to say is stupid or trivial. Some have even
tried to make a pass at him. Just then, he wakes up, but still in a
cold sweat.
IV CONCLUSION
What, finally, should we do with this book? My sense is that it
should not be taken seriously It is not well grounded, well argued,
or convincing. It could have been written much more eloquently
and persuasively as an essay in defense of autonomy and associa-
tional rights, attempting to elevate them above the antidiscrimina-
tion principle. The positions are admittedly and deliberately well
beyond the mainstream of scholarly debate about discrimination
law When Epstein adopts positions within the the mainstream, he
offers nothing significantly new nor does he meaningfully contrib-
ute to existing academic dialogues.
On the other hand, perhaps this book should be taken very seri-
ously, as evidence of the extreme to which backlash against equal-
ity has risen. This book blatantly ignores equality and justice and
blatantly favors those with power and privilege. It turns a blind
eye to reality and to the complex picture of significant progress at
the same time that there is continuing, and deepening, division on
the basis of race and sex. The vision of liberty, choice, and freedom
of association cannot exclude equality and justice; rather, equality
and justice must be the frame within which the picture can be
imagined.
The worst thing to do would be to give it more power or visibil-
ity by paying attention to it. As with the abortion debate, by turn-
ing back to revisit fundamental principles, we are deterred from
more important concerns. Because we are still struggling to retain
the right to choose to control our bodies, we fail to be able to dis-
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cuss the tragic slide of many of our children into poverty We also
fail to discuss the structure of employment and family and how to
make it work for families and children. By trying to defend the
fundamental principles of discrimination law and buying the argu-
ment that the existing structure is radical, we may be deterred
from analyzing why that structure has had only limited success,
and what is necessary to confront racism and sexism. We will be
content to save what we have, instead of exploring the variety of
complex ways, through law and other mechanisms, to address
discrimination.
